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The power losses in the electric power grid are categorized into technical and non-technical 
losses.  Global annual cost of non-technical losses (NTL) to electricity providers is around 
96 billion US dollars, according to Northeast Group, LCC.  NTL can be due to tampering 
with smart meters, attacking data transmitted from smart meters, tapping service cables, or 
malfunctioning of smart meters.  To accurately detect and correct NTL in the distribution 
system, it is essential to first estimate the technical losses.  Estimating the technical losses 
requires the knowledge of the network topology and cables impedances, which might not 
be readily available for the concerned utility company.  This work proposes two main 
contributions.  First, an algorithm that is created for high rate synchronized measurements 
that features two main functions: estimating the cables impedances and estimating the 
technical and non-technical power losses.  Second, a novel method that offers a new unit 
of measurement for energy losses calculation to overcome two practical issues in smart 
metering, the time skew problem and the estimation of energy losses when the 
measurements of smart meters are reported at low frequency.  In addition to that, this work 
proposes a full design of smart meter to be used in the future for hardware implementation 
of a meter capable of recording the new unit of measurement.  Finally, simulations 
performed, and the results verified that the proposed algorithms outperformed previous 






 عبدهللا الئق سناجل شاه :االسم الكامل
 
 وتصحيُحها باستخدام القياس الذكي   الفنيةوغير  الفنيةالكشف الدقيق عن الخسائر  :عنوان الرسالة
 
 الهندسة الكهربائية التخصص:
 
 ٢٠١٨مايو  :تاريخ الدرجة العلمية
. تبلغ التكلفة السنوية العالمية من الخسائر فنيةوغير  فنيةائر تُصنف خسائر الطاقة في شبكة الطاقة الكهربائية إلى خس
مليار دوالٍر أمريكّي، وفقاً لشركة "نورث إيست جروب" المحدودة. يمكن أن  ٩٦لمزّودي الكهرباء حوالي  الفنيةغير 
يع دات الذكية، أو تفربسبب العبث بالعدادات الذكية، أو مهاجمة البيانات المنقولة من العدا الفنيةتنشأ الخسائر غير 
في نظام التوزيع وتصحيحها؛ من  الفنيةللكشف بدقٍة عن الخسائر غير  كابالت الخدمة، أو ُعطٍل في العدادات الذكية. 
المعاوقات ويتطلب معرفة البنية الطوبولوجية للشبكة  الفنيةتقدير الخسائر  أوالً.  الفنيةالضرورّي تقدير الخسائر 
يقترح هذا العمل إسهامين رئيسيّين.  متاحةً بسهولٍة لشركة المرافق المعنيّة.  ، والتي قد ال تكونالكهربائية للكابالت
األول، خوارزميةٌ تم إنشاؤها للقياسات المتزامنة ذات المعدل المرتفع، والتي تتميز بعمليتين رئيسيّتين: تقدير معاوقات 
دةٌ توفّر وحدة قياٍس جديدةً لحساب خسائر الطاقة؛ الثاني، طريقةٌ جدي. الفنيةوغير  الفنيةالكابالت، وتقدير خسائر الطاقة 
للتغلب على مسألتين عمليتين في القياس الذكّي: مشكلة تخالف الوقت، وتقدير خسائر الطاقة عندما تُنقل قياسات العدادات 
صيليٍة الستخدامها ذكّيٍ بمخططاٍت تف إلضافة إلى ذلك، يقترح هذا العمل تصميماً كامالً لعدادٍ االذكيّة بتردٍد منخفٍض. ب
تمت محاكاة الخوارزميات والحلول المقترحة، . وأخيراً، عداد قادر على تسجيل وحدة القياس الجديدةفي المستقبل لتنفيذ 
وتصحيح أدق للخسائر الفنية وغير الفنية.كشف  قادرة علىأثبتت أن الخوارزميات المقترحة حيث أن نتائج المحاكاة 
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Smart metering is an essential requirement in developing smart grids, and advanced billing 
systems.  Smart meters are digital meters that are capable to measure different electrical 
components such as voltage, current, active power, reactive power, time of use, and total 
harmonic distortion.  In addition to that, smart meters provide two-way communication 
capability between the customer and the utility company.  
Smart meters will benefit electric utilities in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia KSA as well as 
overall benefits to its national economy.  Developing smart metering infrastructure will 
reduce operating costs as well as improving the network losses of the utility company.  
Figure 1.1 shows the net present worth of installing smart meters all over the country based 
on 15-year time frame [1].  The study has been done by The Electricity and Cogeneration 
Regulatory Authority ECRA. It shows a net present worth of 1.615 Billion SR by investing 




Figure 1.1: Business case results of smart meter benefits to electric utility companies in Million SR 
Besides the total benefits to the utility company, the benefits to the national economy of 
Saudi Arabia is much more than that (over 100 Billion SR over a 15-year timeframe).  
Figure 1.2 shows the total benefits of the smart metering system to KSA [1]. 
 
Figure 1.2: Business case results of smart meter benefits to Saudi Arabia in Million SR 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia is going to install 12 Million smart meters by 2025 [2].  The 
proposed roadmap of smart meters and smart grid implementation is done by ECRA and 




Figure 1.3: Smart meters & smart grid implementation roadmap 
On the other hand, the smart metering will add software and communication layers to the 
metering infrastructure which allows tampering with the metering and billing data locally 
or remotely in addition to conventional physical tampering of meters.  In 2009, a utility 
company in Puerto Rico (USA) asked FBI to investigate in widespread electricity theft 
which then found to be done by using optical converter connected to a laptop and with 
using a software that is available online, the attackers were able to tamper the readings of 
the meters by changing some settings.  The tampering was offered to households and 
commercial users for $300 and $3000 respectively [3].  Nowadays, smart meter attackers 
can hack into the smart meter and reprogram it with low-cost tools and moderate 
knowledge in computers with the help of software that can be easily found on the Internet 
[4].  Although AMI will add more variability to the metering system, they will provide 
semi-real-time data for the utility company which could be used in detecting attacks on the 
metering and billing system. 
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The wrong reading of smart meters due to malfunction or attack can cause huge loss for 
power companies.  Figure 1.4 shows the energy losses growth in Saudi Arabia, these losses 
are due to two factors, first is technical losses (TL) which come from the heat losses in 
transmission and distribution systems, substations, and other natural losses in equipment 
needed for implementing the power system.  The second is the non-technical losses (NTL) 
which comes from electricity theft, unregistered users, inaccurate readings of meters, and 
inaccurate billing by the utility company.  Compared to some developed countries, Saudi 
Arabia has higher overall network losses as shown in Figure 1.5 [1].  This difference in 
network losses can be due to the difference of KSA system’s technical losses as well as 
non-technical losses compared to other systems. 
 




Figure 1.5: KSA’s network losses compared to other countries in 2010 
In the United States, the electricity losses due to theft estimated to be between 1.5% to 2% 
of the total electricity generated which costs utilities around $6 billion dollars on annual 
basis [5].  Electricity theft rate can differ from one country to another, and it can be as big 
as 50% of distributed electricity in some developing countries [4].  In India, the losses 
related to electricity theft approximated to be around $4.5 billion which is around 1.5% of 
India’s GDP [6].  Figure 1.6 published by International Energy Agency (IEA) shows the 




Figure 1.6: Electric energy losses in some countries, generated based on IEA data of 2014 
Global energy theft was estimated to be around $25 billion every year, where the amount 
of electricity stolen exceeds the generation capacity installed in U.K., France, and Germany 
combined [7];  much recent report offered by Northeast Group LLC, estimates the global 
annual losses of $96 billion due to non-technical losses [8].  Besides the fact that electricity 
theft causes losses related to uncharged electricity, the utility company needs to increase 
the installed system capacity to mitigate the electricity consumption that is not paid for.  
Moreover, the non-technical losses are causing an increase in electricity bill for the 
legitimate end usurers in deregulated markets, which may lead to increase the theft rate due 
to increase in electricity prices.  Moreover, high rates of distribution power losses weather 
TL or NTL may affect the quality of power supplied to the end users [7]. 
1.2 Problem Description 
To reduce the non-technical losses in the distribution network, the development and 










Libya Iraq Venezuela India Brazil Canada Saudi Arabia United
States
Technical + Non Technical Losses as % of Produced GWh in 2014
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as customer theft, noncustomer theft, nonpayment by the customer, and actions of an 
employee of the utility company.  Here we will divide the sources of NTL into three main 
types: NTL due to error, NTL due to attack, and unpaid bills.  NTL due to error is any 
cause of losses due to human error or fault in the measurement or information system such 
as faulty metering equipment, inaccurate calibration of metering equipment, and an error 
in the information system.  The second is the losses due to attack on the system such as 
physical attack or attack on the information system. 
Physical attack can be any type of physical attack such as tapping distribution line, 
tampering with smart meter (bypassing the meter for big loads, connecting jumper parallel 
with cable entering the CT, reverse the current direction in bidirectional meters, replacing 
the CT with another with higher turns ratio, changing the software setting, and 
disconnecting the neutral).  An attack on information system can be any attack that such as 
cyber-attack or agreement with an employee in a utility company.  The sources of NTL are 
summarized in Figure 1.7. 
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To detect the NTL and estimate the amount of lost power, the power flows in the 
distribution secondary need to be examined.  These are the challenges when examining the 
power flow in the distribution systems: 
• The measurements are taken from metering equipment that is installed at different 
locations; hence, the power losses must be determined.  
• To estimate the power losses, first, the cable impedances of the distribution 
secondaries must be determined which are usually not readily available to the 
concerned utility company. 
• The estimation is based on measurements of smart meters and other meters that are 
installed in the distribution system.  The challenge here is that these meters are not 
phasor measurement units (PMUs) which means some state estimation techniques 
cannot be applied (e.g. KCL at a specific node cannot be applied using RMS 
currents without phase angle information). 
• The RMS measurements received from smart meters are not synchronized to an 
accurate common time reference, i.e. there is time skew between the measurements.  
This issue is coming from the drift of real time clock at different temperatures, e.g. 
one of the commercial smart meters in KSA can guarantee only a drift of RTC not 
greater than 0.5 second per day.  Therefore, the statement “power in equals power 
out” is not applicable to measurements that are skewed in time. 
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• Smart meters usually report the energy data for a specific period, not the real-time 
power.  This means that the real-time RMS current also will not be available, and 
the average RMS current availability is not sufficient to estimate the energy losses. 
These challenges need to be solved for accurate detection and correction of technical and 
non-technical losses in distribution secondaries.  This work will propose solutions to solve 
all problems explained above without requiring any additional hardware. 
1.3 Thesis Contribution 
This work aims to design a secure smart metering system that utilizes a method presented 
in [9] to detect and correct errors in smart meters.  The structure and detailed design of 
smart energy meters will be explained as well as the required modification to currently 
used smart meters to implement the proposed solutions.  In addition to that, the practical 
challenges explained in the previous section will be solved for more accurate detection and 
correction of NTL.  The outcome of this work will be:  
• Estimation of power losses in distribution secondaries using the already existing 
smart meters for two systems: 
o System reporting real-time power data at high rate. 
o System reporting energy data at a low rate. 
• Estimation of cable impedances using the already existing smart meters for two 
systems: 
o System reporting real-time power data at high rate. 
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o System reporting energy data at a low rate. 
• Overcome the issue of unavailability of phase angle. 
• Overcome the issue of time skew in smart meters data. 
• Overcome the issue of energy losses estimation when the reported data are energy 
data, e.g. when the system reports the energy say each half an hour instead of real-
time power. 
• Modify an algorithm presented in [9] for more accurate detection and correction of 
technical and non-technical losses. 
• Simulate the proposed algorithms and solutions for detecting NTL. 
• Compare the modified algorithms to algorithms presented in [9]. 
• Provide a design of smart meter to be used in the future for implementation of 
proposed solutions, e.g. this work will propose a new unit of measurement to be 
measured by the smart meter for energy losses estimation. 
The features that are provided by the proposed algorithms in this thesis are not available in 
any previous work.  The simulations verified the ability of the algorithm for accurate 




2 CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Wrong reading of electricity meter can be classified into two main categories; malfunction, 
and attack.  Malfunction of a smart meter can occur due to inaccurate calibration or physical 
damage to the meter, which can result in higher or lower reading than the actual or 
disconnected from the utility.  AMI attackers are classified in [10] into six types, first are 
curious eavesdroppers whose goal is to tamper to serve their curiosity.  The second are the 
electricity thieves to reduce electricity bill or steal by tapping from distribution lines.  Third 
are malicious eavesdroppers where they aim to collect metering data to use it in some 
activities such as housebreaking.  Then swanky attackers who want to show their abilities 
in attacking others.  Also, active attackers who may want to lunch large-scale subversive 
attack on a specific utility or country.  Finally, intrusive data management agencies that 
aim to collect customer data for economic and marketing purposes.  This work is focusing 
on detecting NTL whether it is related to attack/tamper or error/malfunction.  The first 
section of this chapter shows the different techniques used in the literature for detecting 
NTL and the second section explains the different methods used in the previous work to 
implement smart meters for prototyping.  
2.1 Detecting Non-Technical Losses 
There are different classifications used to categorize NTL detection techniques, in [10] the 
NTL detection methods are classified into state-based, classification-based, and game 
12 
 
theory-based.  In [11], the detection techniques pointed out are harmonic generator 
deployment, support vector machine, and using center observer meter.  In this work, a more 
comprehensive classification will be used to classify the reviewed publications, it was 
proposed in [12] and classifies the NTL detection techniques into three categories: a 
theoretical study, non-hardware solution, and hardware solution. 
2.1.1 Theoretical Study 
A theoretical study is focused on defining and analyzing different factors that could be 
related to electricity theft such as region’s economic condition, market characteristics, and 
sociodemographics.  Most of the studies show the relationship between socioeconomic 
status and fraud behavior as cause and effect approach to locating rejoin of high theft rates.  
In [13], Turkey’s socioeconomic data of 8 years (from 2002-2010) along with data of 
electricity theft and its price used to determine socioeconomic fraud motives.  It concluded 
that the most dominant factors causing fraud behavior are education level, amount of 
income, social capital, the percentage of rural population, temperature, amount of 
agricultural production, and electricity price. 
Positive association with electricity theft found in areas with higher electricity price, higher 
temperature distance form comfort temperature, a higher percentage of rural population, 
and a higher agricultural production rate.  A negative correlation with electricity theft found 
in areas of people with higher education level, higher income, and higher social capital.   
In [14], various socioeconomic factors that can affect electricity theft rate referred to; such 
as electricity price, income level, characteristics of the population, agricultural load, 
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unemployment rate, education level, corruption level, political instability, urbanization, the 
probability of detection, and temperature.  
These theoretical studies can help in locating areas with high electricity theft rates as well 
as they will be useful in determining better energy policies and regulations to reduce the 
causes of fraud behavior.  On the other hand, these studies cannot be used to quantify and 
locate specific tampering cases for utility companies. 
2.1.2 Non-Hardware Solution 
The non-hardware solution is mainly based on statistical analysis such as classification, 
estimation, and game theory.  In some cases, the non-hardware solution requires additional 
hardware such as energy meter or PMU at distribution transformer. 
A. Classification 
Classification-based techniques mainly use the data received from individual meters such 
as active power, reactive power, voltage, current, time of use, customer information, and 
inspection notes.  It is detecting NTL by performing statistical analysis on load profiles’ 
data to detect unexpected behavior using artificial intelligence techniques such as machine 
learning or expert systems.  Classification methods that are based on end user data can 
detect NTL in the receiving end only.  It uses consumption patterns to predict future 
expected patterns and compare it with the actual profile.  Classification of the load profiles 
into correct and wrong requires supervised training for the algorithm on historical data with 
known outcomes to track the performance parameters.  In [15] three different methods 
applied on around 700 K consumer’s data which is monthly consumption data four 4 
constitutive years as well as around 400 K inspection data to detect NTL.  The first method 
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used to detect NTL is a Boolean Logic expert system which consists of 14 rules created by 
CHOICE Technologies team where a satisfaction of at least one rule will indicate a non-
technical loss.  The same 14 rules were fuzzified to depend on membership function and a 
degree of relation rather than sold zero or one.  Also, Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
classifier was used to create optimal decision function that is based on minimum 
classification error.  It concluded that the SVM and optimized fuzzy logic outperformed 
the simple Boolean logic.  The most common classification-based technique currently used 
by researchers is SVM with detection rate of approximately (60-70) % [10]. 
Classification based techniques cannot determine the actual power consumed during the 
period of attack (i.e. between the time of the attack and the time of detection).  In addition 
to that, advanced attackers can provide demand profile that is difficult to be detected by 
the algorithm.  Also, the supervised training requires a large number of predetermined load 
profiles which need to be confirmed by many inspections, and in addition to the data used 
for training could not represent the future attaches’ characteristics.  Finally, field testing 
and inspection will be required to confirm the suspected attacks. 
B. State Estimation 
Another non-hardware approach that is used to detect non-technical losses is state 
estimation of the distribution secondary which is done by comparing data received from 
smart meters with the estimated parameters [16], [17], [18], [19].  In [16], smart meter 
malfunction or tampering is being detected by utilizing distribution state estimation (DSE) 
algorithm and analysis of variance (ANOVA) to detect meters with non-technical losses.  
The method firstly will detect an abnormality on distribution transformer level, then it will 
locate the error on the low voltage side.  The proposed method utilizes smart meters that 
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are connected to consumer house, intelligent electronic devices (IED) that are connected 
to the distribution transformer, the network topology, and the SCADA system.  In [17], 
state estimation is used to detect non-technical losses in distribution network by assuming 
that data can be collected from smart meters connected to households and phasor 
measurement units (PMUs) and intelligent electronic devices (IED) connected to 
distribution transformer.  The method is based on a comparison of two parameters, the 
voltage and the current; then the difference is calculated between the estimated values by 
state estimator and the values measured by smart meters.  In [18] the technical losses are 
separated from non-technical losses to estimate the amount of electricity theft by using 
energy balance between the distribution transformer and energy readings of smart meters.  
The losses were estimated in [18] by assuming that the relation between the magnitude of 
the current and the time is piecewise linear.  In addition to that, each house is modeled as 
single-phase load connected by separate cable to the distribution transformer.  In [19] the 
work in [18] was extended to consider the effect of temperature on the technical losses 
assuming that a sensor near the network will send the temperature data every 30 minutes 
and will be the same for all users in the group.  Besides the assumption of a linear 
relationship between the time and the current, none of [18] or  [19] can detect which meter 
is in error.   
All state-estimation techniques used in the literature assumes that the measurements done 
in distribution transformer is correct to detect wrong reading in consumer’s meter.  In 
addition to that, many of NTL detection techniques that are based on state estimation 
requires an accurate model of network topology, which can change due to change in cable 
temperature, system upgrade, and aging of cables.  Moreover, the current smart meters 
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used by utilities do not provide synchro-phasor measurements due to the high cost of this 
technology at this time; hence, practical challenges such as time delay discrepancy between 
the readings of typical smart meters and low-frequency resolution of received data is not 
considered in-state estimation-based NTL detection techniques. 
C. Game Theory 
Third non-hardware approach found in the literature was based on game theory equilibrium 
point as optimal choices for distribution utility and consumers.  In [4], a game of theory 
model used to detect NTL by observing the electricity usage behavior when customers are 
strategic.  It considers both investment and electricity tariff structure decisions for the 
distribution utility for unregulated monopoly as well as perfect competition.  The game 
model used in [4] is the leader-follower game, where the utility company is the leader that 
chooses first its tariff structure and amount of investment in theft detection and the 
consumers are the followers where they make their decisions of the amount of electricity 
used based on that.  The utility company assumed to make their decisions based on 
predetermined number of electricity thieves and the consumers assumed to make their 
decisions based on tariff structure and the probability of being detected.  The probability 
of being detected is based on the amount of electricity stolen and distribution utility 
investment in fraud detection; as any of them increases, the probability of detection 
increases.  The distribution utility revenue assumed to come from billed electricity and the 
fines collected form detected customers.  The framework proposed helps in detecting NTL 
using the expected energy usage by legitimate and fraud consumers with help of a 
realization of probability density function. 
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2.1.3 Hardware Solution 
Hardware solution proposes redundant meters or other addition of hardware to the metering 
system to detect and estimate NTL.  The additional hardware can be an addition to the 
monitoring infrastructure and/or improvement of the metering unit.  The latest can be 
achieved by any additional specification to the currently used metering hardware such as 
sending a signal to utility company when the meter is disconnected from the mains.  
Improving the monitoring infrastructure can be achieved by adding redundant metering 
units or other types of sensors to the AMI to help in detecting NTL; a simple example of 
the addition to the monitoring infrastructure can be doubling the meters to detect wrong 
readings, this technique will double the cost of meters and it will double the required 
communication bandwidth; moreover, in some cases, there will be ambiguity about which 
of the two meters is in error [9].  Doubling meters are usually used for big commercial or 
industrial loads by some utility companies.  Hardware solutions can detect NTL in specific 
regions only, e.g. adding sensors to the smart meter cannot detect NTL that comes from 
tapping the distribution line. 
2.2 Design and Implementation of Smart Metering System 
In the literature, different designs used to implement smart meters that have processing and 
communication capability which can provide real-time data for the utility and the 
consumer.  A personal computer was used as a central processing unit and user interface 
in [20], [21].  Microcontrollers were used as main processing units in [22], [23], [24], [25].  
Different types of Arduinos were used as processing unit of the smart meter such as 
Arduino UNO, Arduino PRO, Arduino MICRO, Arduino MEGA, Arduino Zero.  These 
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microcontrollers were programmed using a C++ programming language and can receive 
voltage and current signals and send control commands to loads.  Moreover, these 
microcontrollers were connected to different communication modules such as Wi-Fi, 
GSM, and ZigBee.  Other types of microcontrollers have been used in prototyping such as 
STM32F407VG [26] and STM32F107VCT6 [27] from Waveshare, PIC18F4550 [28], [29] 
and PIC32MX460F512L [30] from Microchip, MSP430FE423A from Texas Instruments 
[31], and AT89S52 [32]. 
The communication unit is also required for the smart meter in to send metering data to the 
utility such as voltage, current, real power, reactive power, time of use, and outages.  Also, 
the communication unit is required to receive the command signals from the utility 
company.  The type of communication used in the smart meter will affect the physical 
range of the communication channel, bandwidth and data rate, the amount of power 
consumed by the communication module, and the cost.  There are many wired and wireless 
communication technologies that can allow two-way communication between the smart 
meter and the utility company.  Wired technologies provide high data rates and can be used 
for home area network, neighborhood area network, field area network and wide area 
networks.  Different wired technologies that are available now are Fiber Optic, DSL, 
Coaxial Cable, PLC, and Ethernet.  
On the other hand, wireless technologies are flexible and have low installation cost and 
they are recommended for most of neighborhood and field area networks in smart grid [33].  
There are different types of wireless technologies that can be added to smart meters such 
as ZigBee, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Cellular, Wireless Mesh, Wi-MAX, and Satellite Internet.  
Each type has advantages and disadvantages and the most widely used wireless technology 
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in previous work is ZigBee due to its low power consumption.  There are different ZigBee 
modules that are amiable for prototyping, these modules can be connected to 
microcontrollers via I/O ports for two-way communication between two microcontrollers.  
ZigBee based modules were used for prototyping in ([23-26],[30-23]), GSM 
communication modules were used in [24-27], and power line communication PLC was 
used in [26], [31].  Using different communication modules, we can perform two-way 
communication between different smart meters and to the utility.  Moreover, using Wi-Fi 
modules we can connect the smart meters to the internet to provide real-time data and 
control for the user or the utility.  Table 1 shows the comparison of different technologies 
that can be used in smart grid and smart metering system; it is a recreation of the exact 
same Table 1 in [33]. 
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Table 1: Different Types of Communication Technologies for Smart Grid Applications in [33] 
 
Voltage and current can be measured using different types of sensors.  The most widely 
used sensors are current transformers, shunt resistors, hall effect current sensors, and 
Rogowski coil.  Current transformers are widely used for current sensing due to low power 
dissipation, low cost, and its high immunity to external interferences.  On the other hand, 
current transformers are not linear and saturate at higher current levels.  Also, the secondary 
winding of current transformer should be kept close by burden impedance and if the 
secondary side of CT was opened the current transformer will be damaged.  There are 
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different types of CTs available in the market such as ASM series which is used as basic 
current indicator, AC series that is the most commonly used and it is designed to measure 
specific rated current, AP series which provides the highest accuracy but low current rating, 
and C-CT series which can measure current ranges from 0.1 up to 300 A with accuracy of 
1%.  The current is being measured by measuring the voltage on the burden impedance and 
then the AC voltage must be conditioned, filtered, sampled, and quantized to be ready as 
input to the microcontroller.  Shunt resistors (i.e. resistor connected series with the line) 
are very cost effective, but it dissipates big amount of power if the current is high, or if we 
used shunt resistor with very low resistance the voltage drop will be very small, and we 
will need very sensitive sensors to measure small voltage drop on the shunt resistor.  
Another type of current sensor that is widely used for prototyping is hall effect sensor 
module.  It can measure currents up to 150 A and it can be connected to the microcontroller.  
Another module available is analog current input module from National Instruments (NI 
9247 C Series), this module can measure current up to 50 A RMS and it has embedded data 
acquisition system which has a sampling rate of 50 kS/s.  This module provides very 
accurate measurement, but it costs around 6000 S.R. Similar modules has been used with 
5 A RMS current rating (NI 9225 C Series) to implement smart meter in [20].  Hall effect 
current sensor was used by [22], Digital energy meter [23], current transducer [26], [27]. 
To measure the voltage potential transformer or voltage divider can be used to scale down 
the actual voltage.  The potential transformer will allow for electrical isolation of low and 
high voltage sides then the secondary of the transformer is connected to an analog to digital 
converter to convert the AC voltage to a digital output representing quantized voltage 
signal.  On the other hand, if resistive voltage divider is used to scale down the voltage 
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optocoupler should be used between the high voltage side and the low voltage side for 
isolation. 
For the processing, communication, and control units to perform tasks they require a DC 
power source.  The power can be taken from the main line to an AC to DC converter and 
then to different units of the smart meter.  Moreover, a backup rechargeable battery is 
needed to provide required energy during outages and emergencies.  Moreover, LCD 
display is needed to present the real-time values of different electrical quantities such as 




3 CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will explain the methodology used to detect and correct the non-technical 
losses in the distribution network.  Section 3.1 will provide the general description of the 
system; i.e. metering unit and detection algorithm.  In Section 3.2, a novel method will be 
proposed to estimate the service cable impedance.  Section 3.3 will then propose a modified 
algorithm that considers the power losses into account.  Finally, Section 3.4 will propose a 
novel derived unit of measurement to be measured by smart meters that will help in 
estimating the network topology and energy losses when there is time skew between the 
measurements and/or the measurements are taken at low resolution. 
3.1 General Description of the System 
3.1.1 Design of Metering Unit 
The most basic function of the metering unit is to measure the voltage, current, and power 
factor and then calculate the real power, and reactive power consumed in a specific period.  
Unlike conventional power meters, smart meters have processing and communication 
capability which can provide real-time data for the utility and the consumer.  The general 
block diagram of the smart meter is shown in Figure 3.1 and the schematics of the final 





Figure 3.1: General block diagram of smart meter 
A. Measuring the Voltage 
There are different methods that can be used to measure the voltage such as potential 
transformer or voltage divider circuit.  Voltage divider circuit uses simple two resistors to 
step down the line voltage to value that is suitable to be read by ADC.  This method is low 
cost since it needs only two resistors to perform the task, but on the other hand, this method 
will not isolate the high voltage circuitry form the low voltage electronics.  Therefore, surge 
protection can be used to protect the low voltage electronics form high voltage surges.  In 
addition to that, optocouplers can be used also to isolate the two grounds.  It is desired to 
choose high value resistors to divide the voltage to minimize the power losses in the 
resistors.  Another method that can be used to measure the voltage is by using potential 
transformers which will step down the voltage to desired level that is suitable for the ADC.  
This method allows isolation of high voltage circuitry form the low voltage circuitry, but 
the cost will be higher than the voltage divider method.  Potential transformers are similar 
to power transformers, but they are rated at much lower power that is consumed by the 
burden resistors on the secondary side of the potential transformers. 
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In our design, we are going to use small 1.1VA transformer to step down the voltage from 
230V RMS to 10V RMS [34].  Voltage divider circuit will be used to further step down 
the voltage to the range of analog to digital converter in the microcontroller. 
 
Figure 3.2: 230/10V transformer 
B. Measuring the Current 
Current can be measured using different sensors such as shunt resistors, hall effect current 
sensors, Rogowski coils, and current transformers.  Shunt resistors cost is the lowest, but 
they dissipate big amount of power for reasonable voltage drop.  E.g. for voltage drop of 
1V at 100A line current, the shunt resistor must be 10 mΩ which will dissipate 100W when 
the line current is 100A.  On the other hand, using very small shunt resistor will result in 
very small voltage drop which cannot be detected by common ADC used with energy 
measurement IC unless an amplifier is used, which means additional cost and power 
consumption.  In addition to that, shut resistor terminals will be directly coming from the 
high voltage line and isolation circuitry will be required for protection of electronic 
components.  Figure 3.3 shows commercially available shunt resistor used to measure 




Figure 3.3: Commercially available shunt resistor 
Hall effect based current sensors is generating output voltage proportional to the magnetic 
field generated by the current that passes in the conductor.  This type of sensor provides 
isolation between high voltage line and the electronic components.  In addition to that, the 
power consumption of hall effect based current sensors is low.  On the other hand, hall 
effect current sensors are not immune to magnetic interference and the measurements can 
be disturbed by external magnetic fields.  Figure 3.4 shows commercially available 100A 
hall effect based current sensor which can be used for both AC and DC currents. 
 
Figure 3.4: Commercially available hall effect based current sensor 
Rogowski coil sensors are used to measure the AC current. It provides output proportional 
to the rate of change of current.  The coil is wounded around non-magnetic core, which 
makes them operate linearly over wide range of currents due to the absence of iron core.  
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On the other hand, the output voltage is not directly proportional to the primary current, 
and integrator circuit is required to integrate the voltage waveform to represent the current.  
The integrator circuit requires DC supply and will introduce more cost and losses in the 
metering unit.  Figure 3.5 shows 100A commercially available Rogowski coil. 
 
Figure 3.5: Commercially available Rogowski coil 
The most common type of current sensor that is currently used in smart meters is the current 
transformer (CT), current transformers convert the current in primary side into attenuated 
current in secondary side which passes through an ammeter (short circuit) or burden 
resistor for measurement.  Current transformers are different from voltage transformers 
since the number of turns on the primary side is only one turn (the conductor in which the 
current passes) or very few turns.  Current transformer secondary side should never be kept 
as open circuit since that will damage it because the current in the primary side is not 
affected by the secondary side impedance. 
Current transformers provide isolation between the primary and secondary side and typical 
current transformers used for metering and protection converts full-scale primary current 
into 1A or 5A secondary current in most industrial scale metering and protection systems.  
On the other hand, the current transformers used by residential smart meters usually have 
much less secondary current.  Current transformers consume a low amount of power and 
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provide high accuracy, but they saturate when the primary current exceeds the limit of the 
current that can be handled by the iron core.  Figure 3.6 shows 100A commercially 
available current transformer. 
 
Figure 3.6: Commercially available Current Transformer 
Current transformer is used in this design to measure the line currents as can be seen in 
Figure 3.6 [35].  Since the experiment will be performed on programmable loads in the lab 
and the measurements will be much less than an actual residential load profile, the current 
transformers used are rated at 80A for check meters and 30A for regular meters to utilize 
the full range of CT which leads for better accuracy in measurement of current.  Some of 






Table 2: CT Specification [35] 
Attribute 30A CT 80A CT 
Rated frequency (Hz) 50/60 50/60 
Operating current range (Arms) 0.1 to 30 0.1 to 80 
Turns ratio 3000:1 3000:1 
Current magnitude accuracy 1% 1% 
Full scale output current 
(mArms) 
10 26.6 
Phase shift (degrees) 1.7±1.0 1.7±1.0 
Withstanding voltage (Vrms) 2200 2200 
The output voltage characteristics at different values of burden resistors for the 30A CT is 
shown in Figure 3.7.  We can see the effect of burden resistor on the output voltage and the 
saturation of the CT.  High values of burden resistors cause CT saturation at values less 
than the rated.  In addition to that, more power will be consumed in the burden resistor.  
On the other hand, very small values of burden resistor will lead very small output voltage 




Figure 3.7: Output voltage characteristics of the 30A CT [35] 
C. Signal Conditioning 
Signal conditioning is necessary before applying the real-time signal to the analog to digital 
converter.  The essential analog signals that are measured by the smart meters are the 
voltage and the current, where the voltage is sinusoidal waveform which may contain some 
harmonics and the current can take any shape depending on the type of load that draws the 
current and hence in most cases, the current waveform will contain more harmonics than 
the voltage waveform.  To get the best accuracy and low signal to noise ratio, the analog 
signal must be manipulated to minimize external noise. 
There are many processes performed for signal conditioning such as amplification, 
attenuation, conversion, isolation, filtering, and linearization.  Here we will explain the 
most common signal conditioning types used in smart meters.   
1) Amplification: 
Amplification is used to increase the voltage level to better utilize the full range of the 
analog to digital converter ADC and consequently higher resolution and better sensitivity.  
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Amplification must be performed just after sensing the signal from the sensor to minimize 
external noise in the path of the analog signal, this will maximize the signal to noise ratio 
in the signal measured at the output of the signal.  Since the voltage and current 
transformers that we will use in this design will not need any amplification because of their 
relatively high secondary side voltage. 
2) Attenuation: 
Attenuation is required to reduce the range of sensor output analog signal to the range of 
ADC.  It is preferable to perform attenuation as close as possible to the ADC to increase 
SNR.  In the smart meter that we designed, the voltage transformer output is 10V, but the 
ADC works in the range of ±1.65V.  Therefore, the output voltage of voltage transformer 
is attenuated using voltage divider resistors to reduce the 14.14 peak voltage to value less 
than 1.65V.  Therefore, a voltage divider of 1kΩ and 100Ω used to reduce the voltage by 
a factor of 11, which means at a rated voltage of 230V the secondary voltage will be 10V 
and the voltage after voltage divider circuit will be 0.909V (peak of 1.28V).  Now, the 
ADC can measure voltages in the range of 0 up to 295V.  The power losses in the 
transformer’s burden resistors is around 91mW where the voltage transformer is rated at 
1.1VA.  Here we used relatively big values of secondary burden resistors to reduce the 
power losses and increase the accuracy since the transformer’s voltage regulation will be 
low when used at much lower than its rated power. 
Another factor that must be considered is the accuracy of the resistor over the operating 
range since the value of the resistor can change due to change in temperature.  The 
temperature of the resistor can change due to change of environment temperature or heat 
generated by the power dissipation in the resistor.  Therefore, it is necessary to choose a 
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resistor with low temperature coefficient and rated at higher power dissipation value than 
operating range required.  Figure 3.8 shows the 1kΩ metal film resistor we used, the 100Ω 
resistor also metal film resistor that has the exact same characteristics.  The burden resistors 
used here are 0.25W metal film resistors having temperature coefficient 25ppm/ ̊C (parts 
per million per degree centigrade), Table 3 shows the detailed attributes of the resistors 
used. 
 
Figure 3.8: 1kΩ metal film resistor 
Table 3: Resistors’ Attributes 
Tolerance ±0.1% 
Composition Metal film 
Operating temperature -55 ̊C to 155 ̊C 
Temperature coefficient ±25ppm/ ̊C 
Rated power 0.25W 
3) Conversion: 
The output of the current transformer is attenuated current, but the ADC input need to be 
voltage signal, therefore, the current signal need to be converted to a voltage signal using 
burden resistor.  The burden resistor used should be selected so that full scale of ADC is 
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utilized and making sure that the CT will not be saturated at values in the range of interest.  
The burden resistor used are thin film resistors with values of 36 and 120 Ohms for 80A 
and 30A CTs respectively.  
4) Isolation: 
Isolation of low voltage circuitry from high voltage circuity is necessary to avoid damage 
to electronic components.  Ground isolation can be achieved either by using optical 
isolation or electromagnetic isolation.  Optical isolation can be achieved by using 
optoisolator which transfers an electrical signal from one side to another using light.  Since 
many commercial smart meters have voltage divider circuit directly connected to the high 
voltage circuit, optoisolators are used to isolate the ground of ADC and the microcontroller 
form the high voltage ground.  In our design, the potential transformer will provide 
electromagnetic isolation between the low voltage and the high voltage circuitry. 
D. Analog to Digital Conversion 
Analog to digital converter (ADC) converts analog signal to digital signal that can be 
processed in the energy measurement IC or the microcontroller.  Three main characteristics 
must be considered in the selection of analog to digital converter; i.e. resolution, rate, and 
range.  The resolution represents the number of discrete values that represent the analog 
signal, usually expressed in bits.  E.g. 12-bit ADC can have 4096 different levels that can 
represent the analog input.  The higher the resolution, the lowest the difference between 
the actual analog input and the digitalized output (lower quantization error).  In the this 
design, we are going to use the 12-bit ADC intenerated in ATSAM3X8E microcontroller 
[36] that is utilized by Arduino DUE board [37]. 
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The rate of the analog to digital converter is the number of samples per second since the 
voltage and current waveforms are not purely sinusoidal, oversampling is essential for 
accurate RMS calculations.  The ATSAM3X8E microcontroller has a sampling rate of 1 
MSPS [36], but the actual sampling will depend on the length of RMS calculations’ 
instructions executed and the clock frequency (i.e. 84 MHz). 
The range of analog to digital converter is the input voltage range that can be quantized by 
the analog to digital converter.  To reduce the quantization error, the full range of ADC 
must be utilized and some margin for overvoltage or overcurrent incidents.  In the 
microcontroller that we will use, the range is 0 to 3.3V.  The voltage and the current 
transformers’ neutrals will be connected to 1.65V with respect to the microcontroller 
ground for DC biasing as shown in Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 respectively. 
 




Figure 3.10: Current transformer connection 
E. Energy Metering IC 
Some of commercial smart meters have energy metering IC EMIC in addition to the 
microcontroller to do all the processing required for energy calculations.  Others contain 
only the microcontroller, which will be used to perform all the metering calculations and 
communications.  The energy metering IC is basically a fixed function digital signal 
processor DSP that performs signal processing required for metering applications.  The 
digital signal processing that can be performed by the EMIC are scaling, filtering, 
integration, phase calibration, zero-crossing detection, RMS calculations, energy 
calculations, and THD calculations.  Some EMICs have embedded programmable gain 
amplifiers PGA and analog to digital converters in addition to the digital signal processor.  
Figure 3.11 shows the functional block diagram of commercially available metering IC 




Figure 3.11: Commercially Available Energy Metering IC [38] 
Before placing the energy metering IC for operation. It should be firstly configured by 
selecting operation mode, activating the embedded filters, and activating embedded 
integrators according to the requirement of each design.  Then the calibration values such 
as phase compensation and scaling factors for both voltage and current should be 
configured.  The energy metering ICs are usually slave devices, and they can be configured 
by sending write command via SPI/I2C followed by the address of register to be configured 
flowed by the value in twos complement format.  Based on the configuration of the energy 
metering IC, the DSP inside the IC will perform all the calculations in harmony.  The 
calculated values are then stored in harmonic calculation registers that can be accessed by 
the microcontroller via SPI or I2C communication protocols.  The harmonic calculation 
registers can be accessed by the microcontroller by sending read command to the EMIC 
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followed by the register address.  The EMIC will provide the value of harmonic calculation 
in the register specified by the microcontroller after receiving the address of register 
immediately.  The microcontroller should be programmed according to the datasheet of 
EMIC; each EMIC has different interface timing parameters as well as different 
communication protocols.  
E.g. if SPI is chosen to be the communication interface, the serial clock signal will be 
provided by the microcontroller and the MOSI, MISO, SS will be connected as shown in 
Figure 3.12.  The speed of data transmission will depend on the frequency of the serial 
clock (SCLK), it can be in the range of few MHz’s for common EMICs.  There are four 
operation modes for SPI that defines the normal state of serial clock when there is no 
operation (normally high or normally low) and the time where the data is sampled (i.e. 
sampled on clock transition from high-to-low or sampled on lock transition from low-to-
high).  Each EMIC has its own SPI mode defined by the manufacturer that must be 
followed for communication.   
 
Figure 3.12: SPI interface between the EMIC and the microcontroller 
The microcontroller can perform write operation by firstly enabling the slave by making 
SS pin low.  Then the write command (sequence of bits defined by EMIC manufacturer) 
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will be placed on the MOSI data bus.  Synchronously, the EMIC will sample the data from 
MOSI data bus and initialize the write operation.  After that, the microcontroller will place 
the address of register on the MOSI data bus which will let the EMIC point to the target 
register.  Finally, the value to be written will be placed on MOSI data bus and the EMIC 
will write that value to the register.  It is common practice in industry to read back the value 
form the register to confirm successful write operation.  The read operation has the same 
sequence as write operation except that the register value will be transmitted on the MISO 
data bus starting with the first clock transition after the last bit of register address received.  
In our design, the microcontroller will be used to do all the digital signal processing 
required for metering.  
F. Microcontroller 
The brain of the smart meter is the microcontroller, it performs all the tasks such as 
information management, user interface, communication management, calculation of 
electricity bill, application of tariff structure, data storage, recording incidents, and 
tampering detection.  In addition to that, it also can replace the energy metering IC and the 
analog to digital converter.  In our design, we are going to use the microcontroller to 
perform all the tasks of the three blocks shown in Figure 3.1 (i.e. ADC, EMIC, and the 
microcontroller). 
The microcontroller that will be used for the design is Arduino DUE [37], which utilizes 
the powerful 32-bit Atmel SAM3X8E microcontroller [36].  Figure 3.13 shows a top view 
of Arduino DUE board which clearly shows all the I/O pins.  Arduino is open source 
hardware and software platform, which means all the hardware design files and schematics 
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as well as the software tools are available for free and can be used by anyone.  Hence, all 
the Arduino boars can be duplicated from the schematics and used for any commercial or 
non-commercial products, but without using Arduino trademark.  Arduino is the first open 
source hardware that is widely spread, which created a big global community that will 
accelerate the growth of the tool and its applications. 
 
Figure 3.13: Top view of Arduino DUE board  
The Arduino DUE has 12 analog input pins that can be configured as a maximum of 12-
bit ADC.  In addition to that, it has 2 digital to analog converters DAC having a resolution 
of 12-bits.  Moreover, it has 54 digital I/O pins where 12 of them can be used for pulse 
width modulation MWM.  It operates at 84 MHz clock frequency and can provide up to 
800mA on the 3.3V pin. 
The microcontroller will perform all the computations required to determine the true RMS 
voltage and current, active power, reactive power, and power factor.  First digital low pass 
filter will be applied to the digital signals that represent the analog values.  The Arduino 
DUE can sample at 12-bit resolution, which means the analog signals will be represented 
by 12-bit numbers (i.e. 0 to 4095).  After application of the low pass filter and magnitude 
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and phase compensation, the voltage and current samples (i.e. 𝑉[𝑖] and 𝐼[𝑖]) will be ready 
for calculations.  Two types of computations will be performed on the samples (i.e. 
instantaneous calculations and the RMS calculations).  The instantaneous calculations will 
determine the instantaneous power using the two samples available as shown below: 
 𝑃[𝑖] = 𝑉[𝑖] × 𝐼[𝑖] (1) 
where 𝑃[𝑖] is the instantaneous power at instant 𝑖, 
𝑉[𝑖] is the instantaneous voltage at instant 𝑖, and 
𝐼[𝑖] is the instantaneous current at instant 𝑖. 
The sequence of uniformly spaced (in time) values for a specific number of full voltage 

















where 𝑘 is the number of instants used for RMS calculations, 
𝑉𝑅𝑀𝑆[𝑛] is the RMS voltage during time interval 𝑛, and 
𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆[𝑛] is the RMS current during time interval 𝑛. 
The active power is basically the average of instantaneous power and can be calculated by 









where 𝑃[𝑛] is the active power at time interval 𝑛. 
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The rest of quantities can be calculated using RMS voltage, RMS current, and active power 
as: 
 𝑆[𝑛] = 𝑉𝑅𝑀𝑆[𝑛] × 𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆[𝑛] (5) 
 𝑄[𝑛] = √𝑆[𝑛]2 − 𝑃[𝑛]2 (6) 
 





where 𝑆[𝑛] is the apparent power during time interval 𝑛, 
𝑄[𝑛] is the reactive power during time interval 𝑛, and 
𝑝. 𝑓. [𝑛] is the power factor during time interval 𝑛. 
The calculations used here can measure the true RMS values of the quantities, which will 
work for any type of AC signals (i.e. both sinusoidal and non-sinusoidal waveforms).  The 
number of instants captured (i.e. 𝑘) during the period of interest depend on the speed of 
ADC as well as the speed of code execution in the microcontroller.  Therefore, we used the 
powerful 32-bit Arduino DUE microcontroller which have ca lock speed of 84 MHz and 
ADC update rate of 1 MSPS. 
The duration of time interval 𝑛 can be configured by modifying the code that calculates the 
RMS values.  In our design, we used ta ime interval of 1 second in the calculation, so all 
the values calculated will represent the average values during 1 second (i.e. 60 cycles for 
the 60Hz system). 
G. LCD Display and Data Storage 
LCD display is needed to display the measurements and billing information for the user.  
In addition to that, data recording is essential for the smart meters to accumulate the data 
of measurements and alarms for certain period.  In our design, we used colored Arduino 
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1.77" LCD display which comes with embedded micro SD card module.  Figure 3.14 shows 
front view of the display used for our design. 
 
Figure 3.14: Arduino 1.77" LCD display [39] 
The LCD display and the micro SD card module will be connected to the microcontroller 
via SPI interface as shown in Figure 3.15.  The SPI master can be used to control multiple 
slaves by activating the slave that need to be communicated with (it can be done by making 
the slave select pin low).  The serial clock SCLK, master in slave out MISO, and master 




Figure 3.15: SPI Interface between the microcontroller and the LCD and SD card 
H. Real Time Clock 
To keep track of time accurately, real-time clock RTC with battery is required so that the 
system doesn’t lose the track of time when the power goes down.  In our design, we used 
RTC module that utilizes the DS3231 IC which has a crystal oscillator that is temperature 
compensated [40].  It keeps track of year, month, day, hour, minute, and second and can 
provide the time via I2C communication protocol for data logging.  It is accurate up to 3.5 




Figure 3.16: DS3231 accurate integrated RTC 
The DS3231 can communicate with the master device (i.e. the microcontroller) via I2C 
communication protocol.  Unlike SPI interface, the I2C uses only two connections for data 
transmission (i.e. clock line and data line) as shown in Figure 3.17.  In addition to that, 
multiple devices can be connected to the same two buses (SCL and SDA) where each 
device will be activated when the master sends the device address on the serial data line. 
 
Figure 3.17: I2C Interface between the microcontroller and the RTC 
Both SCL and SDA are connected to pull up resistor (i.e. their state is normally high when 
there is no communication).  The communication is initiated when the master place a start 
bit on the SDA line (i.e. pulling SDA line low), after that the master will start the clock for 
synchronous communication.  After that, the microcontroller will send the device address 
on the SDA line so that RTC is initiated (for the DS3231 the device address is 1101000).  
Then the microcontroller will send write bit (i.e. 0) and the RTC will respond by sending 
45 
 
back acknowledge bit (i.e. 0) to confirm successful initiation.  After that, the 
microcontroller will send word address to the RTC to set the register pointer to the required 
register.  Now, the value of the register can be read by setting the microcontroller to send 
read bit (i.e. 1) to initiate read operation, next the RTC will send acknowledge bit (i.e. 0) 
to the microcontroller to indicate that the RTC read is enabled.  Then the RTC will output 
the data and the microcontroller will place acknowledge bit each time one byte is received. 
I. Communication Unit 
The communication unit is required for the smart meter in to send metering data such as 
RMS voltage, RMS current, real power, reactive power, and time of use to the utility 
company.  Also, the communication unit is required to receive the command signals from 
the utility for testing and clock calibration. There are many wired and wireless 
communication technologies that can allow two-way communication between the smart 
meter and the utility company. The type of communication used in the smart meter will 
affect the physical range of the communication channel, bandwidth and data rate, the 
amount of power consumed by the communication module, and the cost.  Wired 
technologies provide high data rates and can be used for home area network, neighborhood 
area network, field area network and wide area networks.  Different wired technologies 
that are available now are Fiber Optic, DSL, Coaxial Cable, PLC, and Ethernet. 
On the other hand, wireless technologies are flexible and have low installation cost and 
they are recommended for most of the neighborhood and field area networks in smart grid 
[33].  There are different types of wireless technologies that can be added to smart meters 
such as ZigBee, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Cellular, Wireless Mesh, Wi-MAX, and Satellite 
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Internet.  Each type has advantages and disadvantages and the most widely used wireless 
technology is ZigBee due to its low power consumption. 
In the proposed design, we are going to use ZigBee module which is capable to 
communicate with the microcontroller using serial communication.  It can be used as 
transmitter or receiver, which makes it good choice for mesh networks that features low 
power consumption.  Figure 3.18 shows the ZigBee module that is used in this design.  
 
Figure 3.18: ZigBee module, (Digi XBee S2C ZigBee) 
Some features of this module is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4: ZigBee module general specifications 
Attribute Value 
Non-line of sight range (indoor) 60 m 
Lin-of-sight range (outdoor) 1200 m 
Current during transmission 
33 mA (boost mode) 
59 mA (normal mode) 
Current during receiving 
28 mA (boost mode) 
45 mA (normal mode) 
Operating voltage 2.1 V ~ 3.6 V 
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The ZigBee module can be interfaced with the microcontroller using SPI as shown in.  The 
SPI master can be used to control multiple slaves by activating the slave that need to be 
communicated with (it can be done by making the slave select pin low).  The serial clock 
SCLK, master in slave out MISO, and master out slave in MOSI are shared between all the 
slaves. 
 
Figure 3.19: SPI Interface between the microcontroller and the ZigBee module 
The schematics of the final design is shown in Appendix C.  Next, the detection 
algorithm is explained in detail.  
3.1.2 Detection Algorithm 
For detection algorithm, a novel method proposed in [9] will be used to design a system 
that can detect and correct errors in smart meters.  This method uses coding which is 
originally used to detect and correct binary data in communication systems.  It is done by 
adding redundant data to the original message, this redundant data will be analyzed by the 
receiver to detect and correct errors.  The redundant data is designed liner combination of 
original bits which carry some of their characteristics.  In [9], Hamming code is used to 
detect and correct errors of meters, this method needs an accurate estimation of power 
losses in the cable.  In this section, the Hamming code and its application to the smart 
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metering system will be explained in detail.  Subsections 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2 is explaining 
the hamming code and its application to smart meters; the model and equations derived are 
performed on example of 4 regular meters and 3 check meters for simplicity.  The example 
can be generalized for 𝑁 regular meters and 𝑀 check meters where the condition 𝑁 ≤
2𝑀 −𝑀 − 1 must be satisfied.  
A. Coding  
Coding was originally used in binary data transmission where we need to transmit 𝑁 bit 
via channel, 𝑀 additional bits can be added that carries designed charlatanistic of original 
𝑁 bits.  Which will result in total of 𝑁 +𝑀 bits need to be transmitted.  Figure 3.20 shows 
simplified model of communication system that uses coding to detect and correct errors.  
Hamming code is one of the coding schemes which was developed in 1950 by Richard 
Hamming to detect and correct single error in binary data transmission.  This code uses 𝑀 
check bits to detect and correct 2𝑀 −𝑀 − 1 data bits; e.g. if 𝑀 = 10 → 210 − 10 − 1 =
1013, here only 10 bits required to detect and correct single error in 1013 data bits. 
 
Figure 3.20: Coding in Communication System 
49 
 
Here, the coding of 4 data bits with 3 check bits are used (i.e. Hamming(7,4)) to show how 
the hamming code works; assume that we want to code the following block of data that 
consists of four bits: 
 𝒃 = [𝑏1  𝑏2  𝑏3  𝑏4] (8) 
where 𝒃 is the vector of data bits to be transmitted, and 
𝑏𝑖 is bit number 𝑖 to be transmitted.  
The vector of data bits will be multiplied by the generator matrix 𝐺 to generate code word 
𝒙 which consist of 7 bits as shown: 
 



















= [𝑥1  𝑥2  𝑥3  𝑥4  𝑥5  𝑥6  𝑥7] 
(9) 
Here the first four values will represent the message bits that will be sent, and the last three 
numbers are check parity bits which carry the designed linear combination of original 
message bits (here it is a Modulo-2 addition, i.e. XORing bits).  Also, we can see that the 
generator matrix 𝐺 can be rewritten as: 
 𝐺 = [ 𝐼4×4  𝐻4×3 ] (10) 
where 𝐼4×4 is identity matrix and 𝐻4×3 is designed based on hamming code algorithm is 
simplified by Table 5 and steps below: 
1- Count the number of bits required to be sent (i.e. 𝑁) 
▪ Here it is 4 bits  
2- Calculate the number of parity check bits required using (𝑁 = 2𝑀 −𝑀 − 1) 
▪ Here it is 3 bits  
3- Create table with the first row shows bit positions  
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▪ Here there are 4 + 3 = 7 positions  
4- All bit positions of power two are positions of parity check bits  
▪ Here they are P1, P2, and P3  
5- All other bits are data bits  
▪ Here they are D1, D2, D3, and D4  
6- Create row for parity bit coverage  
▪ Here they are named P1, P2, and P3  
7- Find the data bits covered by each parity bit (Px) systematically as following  
▪ Starting at position of parity bit (Px) 
i. For first parity bit (P1): mark one position and leave one position  
ii. For second parity bit (P2): mark two positions and leave two 
positions  
iii. For third parity bit (P3): mark four positions and leave four positions 
iv. For parity bit number 𝑀 (PM): mark 2𝑀 positions and leave 2𝑀 
positions until reaching the end of table 
8- Now 𝐻4×3 can be filled as shown below  
▪ First column related to first parity bit (i.e. P1)  
▪ So, P1 covers D1, D2, and D4 which leads to first column to be [1 1 0 1]𝑇 
▪ Similarly, P2 covers D1, D3, and D4 which leads to second column to be 
[1 0 1 1]𝑇 
▪ Similarly, P3 covers D2, D3, and D4 which leads to third column to be 
[0 1 1 1]𝑇 
Table 5: General Rule for Hamming Code 
Bit 
Position 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Data 
Bits 
P1 P2 D1 P3 D2 D3 D4 
P1 x  x  x  x 
P2  x x   x x 
P3    x x x x 
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The code word 𝒙 = [𝑥1  𝑥2  𝑥3  𝑥4  𝑥5  𝑥6  𝑥7] is transmitted and the received string will be 
?̂? = 𝑥 + 𝑒 = [?̂?1  ?̂?2  ?̂?3  ?̂?4  ?̂?5  ?̂?6  ?̂?7] where 𝒆 is an error vector with elements {0,  1} and 
the addition is Modulo-2 addition; for case of error in 𝑥5, the error vector 𝑒 will be as 𝒆 =
[0 0 0 0 1 0 0] and ?̂?5 ≠ 𝑥5.  
The received string ?̂? will be multiplied by the decoding matrix 𝐷 to detect if there is an 
error and the location of the error.  The decoding matrix 𝐷 must be orthogonal to generator 
matrix 𝐺 so that their multiplication results a matrix of size 𝑁 ×𝑁 of all elements equal to 
zero as shown below: 
 



















































We can see that the decoding matrix is taking the form 𝐷 = [𝐻4×3
𝑇    𝐼3×3]
𝑇 where, 𝐼3×3 is 
identity matrix of size 3 and 𝐻4×3
𝑇  is matrix of size 3 × 4 which is transpose of 𝐻4×3.  Now 
we will define syndrome vector as following: 
 𝒔 = ?̂? · 𝐷 = [𝑠1  𝑠2  𝑠3 ] (12) 
Which is of size 1 × 3 and it indicates whether there is an error or not and the location of 
the error.  E.g. when 𝒔 = [0 0 0] it is indication of no error, and when 𝑠 = [1 1 0] it 
indicates an error in ?̂?1.  The location of error can be determined by comparing the form of 
syndrome vector to the rows of the decoding matrix 𝐷, where each row of 𝐷 represents the 
form of syndrome vector for an error in the bit position equal to the row number in decoding 
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matrix 𝐷.  Next, the error detection calculation is shown for two cases, i.e. no error and 
single error in data bits. 
1) No Error: 
When there is no error in any of the transmitted bits then, ?̂? = 𝒙, as shown: 
 



























= 𝑏 · 𝐺 · 𝐷


















































) = [0  0  0] 
(13) 
2) One Error: 































= (𝑏 · 𝐺 + 𝑒) · 𝐷














































= [0  0  0] + 𝑒 · 𝐷 = 𝑒 · 𝐷 = [𝑠1  𝑠2  𝑠3 ]  
(14) 
B. Application to Smart Meters 
In [9], the hamming code is applied to a smart metering system where the data bits will be 
replaced by smart meter readings (i.e. real numbers).  The system configuration shown in 
Figure 3.21 consists of four loads connected to single distribution bus by individual cables; 
each load has a smart meter that reads the amount of power consumed.  Additional three 
check meters are connected across the cables that take designed combination of cables’ 
power measurements.  In [9], two cases of the system are addressed; i.e. no presence of 
power losses in cables and with the presence of power losses in the cables. 
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1) No power losses in the cables: 
 
Figure 3.21: System Configuration 
From Figure 3.21, The vector ?̂?𝒑 can be defined as: 
 𝒙𝒑 = [?̂?𝑝1  ?̂?𝑝2  ?̂?𝑝3  ?̂?𝑝4  ?̂?𝑝5  ?̂?𝑝6  ?̂?𝑝7] (15) 
where ?̂?𝒑 is a vector of measured power by all meters, and 
?̂?𝑝𝑖 is the power reading of meter 𝑖. 
Now, the vector 𝒙𝒑 can be defines as: 
 𝒙𝒑 = [𝑥𝑝1  𝑥𝑝2  𝑥𝑝3  𝑥𝑝4  𝑥𝑝5  𝑥𝑝6  𝑥𝑝7] (16) 
where 𝒙𝒑 is a vector of actual power flow supposed to be measured by all meters, and 
𝑥𝑝𝑖 is the actual power consumption supposed to be measured by meter 𝑖. 
If all meters’ readings are correct then, ?̂?𝒑 = 𝒙𝒑, and if one meter is in error then, ?̂?𝒑 =
𝒙𝒑 + 𝒆 where 𝒆 = [𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3 𝑒4 𝑒5 𝑒6 𝑒7].  The check meters are connected so that they 
























= [ ?̂?𝑝1 ,  ?̂?𝑝2 ,  ?̂?𝑝3 ,  ?̂?𝑝4 , ?̂?𝑝1 + ?̂?𝑝2 + ?̂?𝑝4 , ?̂?𝑝1 + ?̂?𝑝3
+ ?̂?𝑝4 , ?̂?𝑝2 + ?̂?𝑝3 + ?̂?𝑝4 ]
= [?̂?𝑝1  ?̂?𝑝2  ?̂?𝑝3  ?̂?𝑝4  ?̂?𝑝5  ?̂?𝑝6  ?̂?𝑝7] 
(17) 
The decoding matrix 𝐷 must be modified since Modulo-2 addition will not detect and 
correct the error when the values are real numbers.  The modification is done to the identity 
matrix as shown below: 
 𝐷∗ = [𝐻4×3





























Application of the modified decoding matrix is shown for two cases, i.e., no mete in error 
and one meter in error. 
Case 1: No meter in error: 
 
𝒔𝒑 = 𝒙𝒑. 𝐷


























































Case 2: One meter in error: 
 
𝒔𝒑 = ?̂?𝒑. 𝐷



























= ([𝑥𝑝1  𝑥𝑝2  𝑥𝑝3  𝑥𝑝4  𝑥𝑝5  𝑥𝑝6  𝑥𝑝7]



























= [𝑠𝑝1 𝑠𝑝2 𝑠𝑝3] 
(20) 
Here 𝒔𝒑 will be one row of decoding matrix 𝐷 multiplied by a scaler which represents the 
magnitude of error.  The location of error can be determined by comparing the form of 
syndrome vector to the rows of the decoding matrix 𝐷, where each row of 𝐷 represents the 
form of syndrome vector for an error in the meter number equal to the row number in 
decoding matrix 𝐷.  The error vector 𝒆 can be created based on syndrome vector, where all 
the entries of 𝒆 will be zero except one entry which corresponds to the meter in error.  The 
correct values can be determined by subtracting the error vector to the meter readings as 
shown below: 
 
?̂?𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = [?̂?𝑝1  ?̂?𝑝2  ?̂?𝑝3  ?̂?𝑝4  ?̂?𝑝5  ?̂?𝑝6  ?̂?𝑝7]
− [𝑒1   𝑒2   𝑒3   𝑒4   𝑒5   𝑒6  𝑒7]
= [𝑥𝑝1  𝑥𝑝2  𝑥𝑝3  𝑥𝑝4  𝑥𝑝5  𝑥𝑝6  𝑥𝑝7] 
(21) 
2) Presence of power losses in the cables 
Since the regular meters are installed at load centers and the check meters are installed at 
distribution bus, there will be power losses in the cables which may lead the coding scheme 
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to fail.  When there is power losses in the cables, the readings of regular meters must be 
multiplied by a factor in the coding scheme to account for power losses in the cables.  To 
see the effect of power losses in the cables on detection scheme, we will define 𝛿𝑖 where it 
represents the actual amount of power losses in cable 𝑖 as percentage of regular meter 
reading.  The factor 𝛿𝑖 will be added in generator matrix 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 for the case of no error and 
calculate the syndrome vector as shown below: 
 
𝒔𝒑 = [𝑥𝑝1  𝑥𝑝2  𝑥𝑝3  𝑥𝑝4 ]. 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠. 𝐷
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𝑥𝑝1 + 𝑥𝑝2 + 𝑥𝑝4
𝑥𝑝1 + 𝑥𝑝3 + 𝑥𝑝4



































−𝛿1𝑥𝑝1 − 𝛿2𝑥𝑝2 − 𝛿4𝑥𝑝4
−𝛿1𝑥𝑝1 − 𝛿3𝑥𝑝3 − 𝛿4𝑥𝑝4
−𝛿2𝑥𝑝2 − 𝛿3𝑥𝑝3 − 𝛿4𝑥𝑝4
)
𝑇
≠ [0 0 0 ] 
(22) 
It can be seen that the syndrome vector 𝒔𝒑 resulted in non-zero values for case of no error, 
therefore the decoding matrix 𝐷∗ need to be modified to account for power losses by adding 
the term 𝛿𝑖 to the decoding matrix which represent the estimated ratio of power losses in 
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Now, the syndrome vector is calculated as: 
 












𝑥𝑝1 + 𝑥𝑝2 + 𝑥𝑝4
𝑥𝑝1 + 𝑥𝑝3 + 𝑥𝑝4
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When the estimated power losses equal to the actual power losses (i.e. 𝛿𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖), the 
syndrome vector for the case of no error will be zero (i.e. 𝒔𝒑 = [0 0 0]).   If the value of 𝛿𝑖 
is not estimated accurately, it may lead the coding scheme to fail.  Therefore, it is essential 
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to develop a method to accurately estimate the power losses in each cable, and this is one 
of the contributions of this thesis. 
3.2 Estimation of Power Losses 
Installation of the regular meters and the check meters at different locations will cause 
differences in readings between the regular meters and the check meters due to power 
losses in the cables.  This might cause the coding scheme to fail and syndrome vector 𝒔𝒑 
will give wrong results.  To estimate the power losses, the network topology is needed.  In 
this section we will propose a method to estimate the power losses using the smart meters’ 
measurements.  First, the formulation power losses proposed in [9] will be modified for 
more accurate estimation because the power losses cannot be modeled as constant ratio of 
active power as will be explained next. 
The active power losses in cable 𝑖 equals to 𝛿𝑖(𝑡)𝑝𝑖(𝑡), where 𝛿𝑖(𝑡) is the ratio of active 
power losses in cable 𝑖 at time 𝑡 referred to active power injection into cable 𝑖, and 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) 
is the active power injected at cable 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  Now, the following equation can be 
derived: 
 𝛿𝑖(𝑡)𝑝𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑡) − 𝑥𝑝𝑖(𝑡) (25) 
where 𝑥𝑝𝑖(𝑡) is the active power consumed by load 𝑖 at time 𝑡.  
Now, assuming that we have the value 𝑅𝑖 that is the resistance of cable 𝑖 then, 











We can see that 𝛿𝑖(𝑡) is function of time and it depends on the active power consumption 
as well as the current.  The current depends on the active power, reactive power, and 
voltage at receiving end.  This means that the value of 𝛿𝑖 in (24) is function of time and 
cannot be presented by a constant ratio of active power consumption.  In addition to that, 
using time varying 𝛿𝑖, i.e. 𝛿𝑖(𝑡) in (27), requires the RMS current flowing in cable 𝑖 and 
the active power consumption of load 𝑖.  These values can be obtained from regular meter 
𝑖 for case of no error or an error in one of the check meters.  But for an error in one of the 
regular meters (which can be the case for most errors), the values obtained to calculate 
𝛿𝑖(𝑡) will be wrong, and consequently failure of the algorithm.   
Next, the issues addressed will be solved using novel methods.  Subsection 3.3.1 will 
propose new method to estimate the cable impedance form the already existing system 
when there is no error, and Subsection 3.1.2 will propose modified algorithm that is capable 
to include the power losses in the detection algorithm for all three cases (i.e. no meter in 
error, check meter in error, and regular meter in error).  In addition to that, Subsection 3.1.2 
will address and solve the issue of non-technical losses that is related to other types of 
attacks such as cable taping.  All the solutions proposed doesn’t require any additional 
hardware to the system (i.e. no cost will be added to the original system). 
3.2.1 Estimation of Cable Impedance 




 𝑥𝑝5 = 𝑥𝑝1 + 𝑥𝑝2 + 𝑥𝑝4 + 𝑃1𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃2𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
𝑥𝑝6 = 𝑥𝑝1 + 𝑥𝑝3 + 𝑥𝑝4 + 𝑃1𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝐿3𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
𝑥𝑝7 = 𝑥𝑝2 + 𝑥𝑝3 + 𝑥𝑝4 + 𝑃2𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃3𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
(28) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 is the power losses in cable 𝑖. 
We have three equations and four unknowns need to be determined for this case, where for 
case when there are 𝑀 check meters there will be 𝑀 equations and 2𝑀 −𝑀 − 1 unknowns 
need to be determined which cannot be solved using these equations derived from check 
meters.  To solve this issue, we can define new equation as the addition of all three 
equations as: 
 ?̂?𝑝5 + ?̂?𝑝6 + ?̂?𝑝7 − 2?̂?𝑝1 − 2?̂?𝑝2 − 2?̂?𝑝3 − 3?̂?𝑝4
= 2𝑃1𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 2𝑃2𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 2𝑃3𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 3𝑃4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
(29) 
Since all the unknowns in (29) (i.e. 𝑃1𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 , 𝑃2𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠, 𝑃3𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠, and 𝑃4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠) are changing with 
time, the equation will be presented as: 
 𝑥𝑝5(t) + 𝑥𝑝6(t) + 𝑥𝑝7(t) − 2𝑥𝑝1(t) − 2𝑥𝑝2(t) − 2𝑥𝑝3(t) − 3𝑥𝑝4(t)
= 2𝑃1𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) + 2𝑃2𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) + 2𝑃3𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) + 3𝑃4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) 
(30) 
where 𝑥𝑝𝑖(𝑡) is the correct active power consumption measured by meter 𝑖 at time 𝑡, and  
𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) is the power losses in cable 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
Since the power losses is changing at each time instant, the unknowns in (30) (i.e. 
𝑃1𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t), 𝑃2𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t), 𝑃3𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t), and 𝑃4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t)) will be changed to fixed values along with 
changing values that can be measured by smart meters (i.e. the RMS current).  Because the 
distribution secondary cables are relatively short and operate at low voltages, the shunt 
capacitance and conductance can be ignored [41].  Consequently, the RMS current at 
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sending and receiving end will be the same and the active power losses can be calculated 
as: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) = 𝑅𝑖𝐼𝑖
2(𝑡) (31) 
where 𝑅𝑖 is the series resistance of cable 𝑖, and 
𝐼𝑖(𝑡) is the correct RMS current that is measured by meter 𝑖. 
Now, equation (30) can be changed to: 







Now, we can generate four different independent equations from four different time 
instants (i.e. 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, and 𝑡4) to solve for the four unknowns 𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, and 𝑅4. 
The same can be applied to reactive power as shown: 
 𝑥𝑞5(t) + 𝑥𝑞6(t) + 𝑥𝑞7(t) − 2𝑥𝑞1(t) − 2𝑥𝑞2(t) − 2𝑥𝑞3(t) − 3𝑥𝑞4(t)
= 2𝑄1𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) + 2𝑄2𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) + 2𝑄3𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) + 3𝑄4𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) 
(33) 
where,  
 𝑄𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t) = 𝑋𝑖𝐼𝑖
2(𝑡) (34) 
and, 







where 𝑥𝑞𝑖(t) it the actual reactive power measured by meter 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 
𝑄𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠(t), is the reactive power losses in cable 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 
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𝑋𝑖 is the series reactance of cable 𝑖. 
Using (32) and (35), four independent equations can be derived from four different time 
instants (i.e. 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, and 𝑡4) to solve for the unknowns (𝑅1, 𝑅2, 𝑅3, 𝑅4) and (𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3, 
𝑋4).  The same can be generalized for case of 𝑀 check meters where we need 2
𝑀 −𝑀 − 1 
different operating points (i.e. 𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡2𝑀−2−1) to solve for (𝑅1, 𝑅2, … 𝑅2𝑀−𝑀−1) and 
(𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋2𝑀−𝑀−1).  The cable impedance can be calculated once when no meter is in 
error on a regular basis (to account for potential system reconfiguration and cable aging), 
then it can be used in detection algorithm as will be explained next. 
3.2.2 Modified Detection Algorithm 
To include the active and reactive power losses in the calculation, the syndrome vector will 
be calculated for both active and reactive power and also the power losses will be included 
in the calculation as: 




























?̃?𝒑 is the modified active power syndrome vector,  
?̂?𝒑 is the vector of active power consumption measured by all meters,  
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?̂?𝐿 is vector of active power losses calculations based on measurements received form 
regular meters,  
𝐼𝑖 is the RMS current measured be meter 𝑖, and 
𝐷 is the decoding matrix. 
The same can be applied to reactive power losses as: 




























?̃?𝒒 is the modified reactive power syndrome vector,  
?̂?𝒒 is the vector of active power consumption measured by all meters, 
?̂?𝐿 is vector of reactive power losses calculations based on measurements received form 
regular meters, and  
𝐷 is the decoding matrix. 
For errors in smart meters, there are three possible scenarios which are: no meter in error, 
check meter in error, and regular meter in error.  In addition to that, the estimation of other 
sources of non-technical losses will be addressed as well.  The modified algorithm for each 
type is explained next. 
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A. No Meter in Error 
When there is no meter in error, then the following equations will be satisfied: 
 ?̂?𝒑 = 𝒙𝒑 (40) 
 ?̂?𝒒 = 𝒙𝒒 (41) 
 ?̂?𝑳 = 𝑷𝑳 (42) 
 ?̂?𝑳 = 𝑸𝑳 (43) 
where, 
𝒙𝒑 is the vector of actual active power supposed to be measured by all meters,  
𝒙𝒒 is the vector of actual reactive power supposed to be measured by all meters, 
𝑷𝑳 is the vector of actual active power losses, and  
𝑸𝑳 is the vector of actual reactive power losses. 
Therefore, the active and reactive power’s syndrome vectors must return zeros as: 














































































































= [ 0    0    0 ] 
(44) 
The same can be applied to reactive power as: 
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= [ 0    0    0 ] 
(45) 
B. Check Meter in Error 
When a check meter is in error, the vector of active and reactive power measurement will 
not equal to the actual values supposed to be measured by check meters, but the vectors of 
active and reactive power losses, i.e., (42) and (43), will be correct since they are calculated 
based on measurements received form regular meters only, therefore: 
 ?̂?𝒑 ≠ 𝒙𝒑 (46) 
 ?̂?𝒒 ≠ 𝒙𝒒 (47) 
The syndrome vector will result in a vector that has a form similar to one of the rows of 
decoding matrix multiplied by a scaler equal to the magnitude of error, e.g. assuming an 
error in the measurement of check meter 6, the syndrome vector will result in: 
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= [ 0     − 𝑒𝑥𝑝6         0 ] 
(48) 
where 𝑒𝑥𝑝6 is the error in active power measurement of check meter number 6. 
We can see that the form of the syndrome vector is similar to row 6 of decoding matrix 𝐷 
multiplied by a scaler equal to the magnitude of error.  Now, the measurement vector (i.e. 
?̂?𝒑) can be corrected by subtracting the error vector as: 
 ?̂?𝒑𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 = ?̂?𝒑 − 𝒆𝒙𝒑, (49) 
where,  
 𝒆𝒙𝒑 = [0    0    0    0    0     𝑒𝑥𝑝6    0] (50) 
?̂?𝒑𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅  is the vector of actual active power supposed to be measured by all meters, and  
𝒆𝒙𝒑 is error vector of active power. 
The same can be applied to reactive power as: 
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= [0     − 𝑒𝑥𝑞6         0 ] 
(51) 
and, 
 ?̂?𝒒𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 = ?̂?𝒑 − 𝒆𝒙𝒒, (52) 
where, 
 𝒆𝒙𝒒 = [0    0    0    0    0    𝑒𝑥𝑞6    0] (53) 
𝑒𝑥𝑞6 is the error in reactive power measurement of check meter number 6,  
?̂?𝒒𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅  is the vector of actual reactive power supposed to be measured by all meters, and  
𝒆𝒙𝒒 is error vector of reactive power. 
This method can be used for any combination of errors in one of the check meter 
measurements (i.e. error in active power measurement, error in reactive power 
measurement, error in RMS current measurement, error in RMS voltage measurement, or 
any combination of these errors). 
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C. Regular Meter in Error 
When a regular meter is in error, the active and reactive power measurement will be wrong 
(i.e. (46) and (47)) as well as the active and reactive power losses vectors as shown: 
 ?̂?𝑳 ≠ 𝑷𝑳 (54) 
 ?̂?𝑳 ≠ 𝑸𝑳 (55) 
The syndrome vector will result in a vector that has a form similar to one of rows of 
decoding matrix multiplied by a scaler equal to the magnitude of error in addition to other 
nonlinear terms, to demonstrate that, we will assume an error in measurement of regular 
meter number 3, the active power’s syndrome vector will result in: 

































































































𝑒𝑥𝑝3 + 2𝑅3𝐼3𝑒𝐼3 + 𝑅3𝑒𝐼3
2






where 𝑒𝑥𝑝3 is the error in active power measurement of regular meter 3, and 
𝑒𝐼3 is the error in current measurement of regular meter 3. 
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The reactive power’s syndrome vector will result in: 











































































































where 𝑒𝑥𝑞3 is the error in reactive power measurement of regular meter 3. 
We can see that the syndrome vector includes the error in active and reactive power 
measurements (i.e. 𝑒𝑥𝑝3, and 𝑒𝑥𝑞3), but it also includes additional terms that will affect the 
corrected values; therefore, the syndrome vector cannot be used directly to correct the 
measurement of regular meter.  To determine the actual value, we can use the measurement 
of one of the check meters measuring the current of the meter in error and subtract the 
measurements of other regular meters.  As can we see the configuration in Figure 3.21, to 
determine 𝐼3 we can say: 
 𝐼7 = 𝐼2 + 𝐼3 + 𝐼4  




Now, 𝐼3 calculated using (58) can be used to calculate the correct vector of active and 
reactive power losses, i.e. 𝑷𝑳 and 𝑸𝑳, to be used then in (56) and (57).  On the other hand, 
(58) can only be applied when the phase difference between the sending end bus voltage 
and all the currents is the same, i.e. 𝜃𝑣 − 𝜃𝐼2 = 𝜃𝑣 − 𝜃𝐼3 = 𝜃𝑣 − 𝜃𝐼4 because the smart 
meters can provide the RMS currents not the phaser currents.   Since it is not uncommon 
that the power factor of each load is different, equation (58) cannot be used for estimation 
of 𝐼3. 
This issue can be solved by determining 𝐼3 from addition of the wrong active and reactive 
power measured to the wrong active and reactive power losses calculated in (56) and (57), 
then subtract the mismatch detected form the syndrome vector which will add up and will 
equal to the actual active and reactive power at sending end as: 
 𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑑3 = (𝑥𝑝3 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝3) + 𝑅3(𝐼3 + 𝑒𝐼3)
2
− (𝑒𝑥𝑝3 + 2𝑅3𝐼3
2𝑒𝐼3 + 𝑅3𝑒𝐼3
2 )




 𝑥𝑞𝑠𝑑3 = (𝑥𝑞3 + 𝑒𝑥𝑞3) + 𝑋3(𝐼3 + 𝑒𝐼3)
2
− (𝑒𝑥𝑞3 + 2𝑋3𝐼3
2𝑒𝐼3 + 𝑋3𝑒𝐼3
2 )
= 𝑥𝑞3 + 𝑋3𝐼3
2 
(60) 
where 𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑑3 is the actual active power at sending end, and 
𝑥𝑞𝑠𝑑3 is the actual reactive power at sending end. 









and the actual active and reactive power can be calculated as: 
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 𝑥𝑝3 = 𝑥𝑝𝑠𝑑3 − 𝐼3𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
2 𝑅3 (62) 
and, 
 𝑥𝑞3 = 𝑥𝑞𝑠𝑑3 − 𝐼3𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
2 𝑋3 (63) 
where 𝐼3𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  is the actual (corrected) RMS current at sending end, and 
𝑉𝑠𝑑𝑟𝑚𝑠  is the RMS voltage at sending end measured by any check meter (i.e. 5, 6, or 7). 
Now, the magnitude of error can be calculated as: 
 𝑒𝑥𝑝3 = ?̂?𝑝3 − 𝑥𝑝3 (64) 
and, 
 𝒆𝒙𝒑 = [0    0     𝑒𝑥𝑝3     0    0    0    0] (65) 
𝑒𝑥𝑝3 is the error in active power measurement of regular meter number 3, and the same can 
be applied to reactive power as: 
 𝑒𝑥𝑞3 = ?̂?𝑞3 − 𝑥𝑞3 (66) 
and, 
 𝒆𝒙𝒒 = [0    0     𝑒𝑥𝑞3     0    0    0    0] (67) 
where 𝑒𝑥𝑞3 is the error in reactive power measurement of regular meter number 3. 
Equations (59) and (60) can be used for any error in regular meters (i.e. error in active 
power, error in reactive power, error in RMS current, error in RMS voltage, or any 
combination these errors). 
This method can detect any type of attack on smart meters and/or any type of malfunction 
in the metering unit that affects the measurements of power consumption.  The attack can 
be physical such as connecting a jumper between the same phase terminals of a smart meter 
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to enforce some current to bypass the CT, connecting some loads directly to the incoming 
cable before going to the meter, changing the CT of the meter with one having higher turns 
ratio, … etc.  Also, it can detect any type of cyber-attack on the meter and/or its data that 
is aiming to tamper with power measurements of smart meters such as: changing the 
firmware of smart meter locally or remotely, attacking the communication system, 
attacking the information system of the utility company, … etc. 
D. Other Sources of NTL 
After inspection, if the service provider found that the mismatch in syndrome vector was 
due to other source of NTL such as cable tapping, then the regular meter is not in error and 
by using the data stored in the database the power consumed due to the new source of NTL 
can be calculated as: 































































































≠ [0   0   0] 
(68) 
Here all the smart meters readings are correct, but the syndrome vector will return non-
zero numbers due to another source of NTL.  The check meter readings 𝑥𝑝5, 𝑥𝑝6, and 𝑥𝑝7 
will include an additional term 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑝that represents the power consumed due to the new 
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source of NTL.  For example, if 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑝3 is the active power related to cable 3, then (68) will 
result in: 
 ?̃?𝒑 = ?̂?𝒑 · 𝐷 + ?̂?𝑳 · 𝐷 = 𝒙𝒑 · 𝐷 + 𝑷𝑳 · 𝐷 = [0    − 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑝3     − 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑝3] (69) 
Similarly, the reactive power syndrome vector can be written as: 
 ?̃?𝒒 = ?̂?𝒒 · 𝐷 + ?̂?𝑳 · 𝐷 = 𝒙𝒑 · 𝐷 + 𝑷𝑳 · 𝐷 = [0    − 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑞3     − 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑞3] (70) 
where 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑞3 is the reactive power NTL related to cable 3. 
Here 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑝3 and 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑞3 will appear in all check meters taking measurement of cable 
corresponding to the cable being tapped.  Furthermore, 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑝3 and 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑞3 include the direct 
and indirect NTL related to the attack, e.g., if the source of NTL was tapping the service 
cable, the values 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑝3 and 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝑞3 represents the sum of power consumed and the power 
losses added to the service cable because of the tapping.  Here we can consider the power 
losses in the cable as NTL instead of being TL; because this amount of losses would not 
exist if the source of NTL had not been present.  
3.3 Practical Challenges 
Commercially available metering systems usually have metering data reported at a rate 
equal to or lower than once every 15-minutes to minimize the bandwidth requirements and 
the power consumption in the communication layer.  For instance, the default rate of real-
time data measurement of a metering system offered by PG&E is one set of data each hour 
[42].  Using high data rates will require a big investment in the communication 
infrastructure (e.g. using fiber optics instead of wireless mesh networks).  Applying the 
detection algorithm to the data received have two main issues, i.e. time skew between the 
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data stream received from different meters, and measurement of energy losses form energy 
information. 
3.3.1 Time Skew 
To accurately detect and correct the errors in smart meters, it is necessary to have the data 
synchronized accurately to a common reference time frame during data logging; otherwise, 
the detection algorithm may fail due to nature of the residential loads where there is always 
rapid change in the demand curve when an appliance turns on and off.  Figure 3.22 shows 
the time skew between two quantities, 𝑥1(𝑡) and 𝑥2(𝑡), where 𝑥1(𝑡1 − 𝜖) will be compared 
to 𝑥2(𝑡1) instead of 𝑥1(𝑡1). 
 
Figure 3.22: Demonstration of time skew problem 
The received data need to be accurately synchronized where a small-time skew (e.g. 1 
second) may cause the detection algorithm to fail.  Synchronized data logging to a common 
time reference can be achieved using phasor measurement units (PMUs) where all devices 
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are synchronized using timing signal received from GPS, but installation of PMUs has two 
main issues; first, they are too expensive to be installed as smart meters for residential 
customers (at least at the current PMU prices).  Second, reporting real time data of all 
residential customers by PMUs requires bigger communication bandwidth which will 
require more investment in communication infrastructure. 
This issue can be solved by using the active and reactive energy consumption instead of 
real-time power.  The energy is basically the area under the power curve, using the area 
under the active and reactive power will reduce the error that is caused by time skew as can 
be seen in Figure 3.23.  The load profiles shown in the Figure 3.23 does not represent actual 
load profile data ant it is used only for demonstration of concept.  
 
Figure 3.23: Demonstration of the effect of using the area in reducing the error cause by time skew 
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It can be seen that the reference time window (green dotted vertical lines) represents the 
period of interest to compare two different load profiles, 𝐿1(𝑡) and 𝐿2(𝑡).  As can be seen, 
there is time skew between the two data streams where the data related to load profile 𝐿2(𝑡) 
is leading the data related to 𝐿1(𝑡) by time 𝛥𝑡.  If we used the active power in the detection 
algorithm, 𝐿2(𝑡1 − 𝜖) will be compared to 𝐿1(𝑡1) instead of 𝐿2(𝑡1).  Which will lead to 
percentage error as shown: 
 
% 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝐿 = |
𝐿2(𝑡1) − 𝐿2(𝑡1 − 𝜖)
𝐿2(𝑡1)
| × 100 (71) 
On the other hand, if we used the energies (areas) to compare the measurements of the two 
load profiles, 𝐸2(𝑘2) + 𝐸2(𝑘3) will be compared to 𝐸1(𝑘1)  instead of 𝐸2(𝑘3) + 𝐸2(𝑘4).  
Which will lead to percentage error as shown: 
 
% 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝐸 = |






| × 100 
(72) 
It can be seen that 𝐸2(𝑘3) is removed from the percentage error calculation, which will 
reduce the error as percentage of actual value greatly.  As the value of 𝐸2(𝑘3) becomes 
bigger, the percentage error will reduce.  The value of 𝐸2(𝑘3) can be increased if we used 
bigger period of interest, i.e. energy accumulation for longer time.  Now with the use of 
energy instead of power, the percentage error due to time skew will be reduced, the 
computation power required will reduce, and the communication bandwidth requirement 











On the other hand, the usage of energy will create other challenges such as estimation of 
energy losses in the period of interest as will be addressed next.  
3.3.2 Estimation of Energy Losses 
Using energies instead of real-time power in detection algorithm will reduce the error due 
to time skew and will reduce the bandwidth required since the smart meter will report the 
active and reactive energy consumed in a specific period without reporting the real-time 
power consumption.  On the other hand, this will create a challenge in the estimation of 
energy losses because the energy losses cannot be estimated from the load energy data 
only.  For illustration, the energy losses in two identical cables will be calculated for a 
period of one hour as shown in Figure 3.24.  Because the distribution secondary cables are 
relatively short and operate at low voltage levels, the shunt capacitance and conductance 
can be ignored [41]. 
The two loads simulated that consume the same amount of energy during a period of one 
hour.  The load profiles are based on actual load profiles of a house at different times during 
the day, 𝐿1 the load profile of the house from 08:30 to 09:30, and 𝐿2 is the load profile 
from 14:40 to 15:40.  Since it was not possible to find two time slots in the real load profile 
that consumes the exact same energy during one hour, we added constant base power 
consumption to the load profile 𝐿1 to make it consume the same amount of energy as 𝐿2 




Figure 3.24: Case study of two loads consuming the same amount of energy in an hour 
The simulation results are summarized in Table 6, and show that for the same amount of 
consumed energy in an hour, the energy losses in each cable is different.  From the 
demonstration example, we can see that it is not possible to determine the energy losses in 
the cable using the energy consumption data even if we have the network topology because 
the energy losses will mainly depend on the real-time RMS current passing in the cable.  
The real-time RMS current depends on real-time active power, reactive power, and voltage 





Table 6: Energy losses in identical cables 
Attribute 𝑳𝟏 𝑳𝟐 
Duration (𝒎𝒊𝒏𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒔) 60 60 
Energy consumed (𝒌𝑾𝒉) 1.92711 1.92711 
Energy losses (𝑾𝒉) 35.13 72.47 
% of energy losses 1.82 % 3.76 % 
To solve this issue, we can use phasor measurement units (PMUs) which report real-time 
current that can be used to estimate the real-time active power losses (using 𝐼2𝑅) and 
accumulate the calculated power losses to determine the active energy losses in the cable 
during period of interest.  But as mentioned earlier, we will assume that the PMUs are not 
used as smart meters due to their high cost at this time.  Therefore, we proposed a novel 
derived unit of measurement to be measured by the smart meter in the same manner of 
energy to calculate the energy losses in the cables.  The smart meters can be reprogrammed 
to measure the area under the squared current as: 
 








where 𝐴𝑅𝐼2 is the area under the squared current curve in (𝐴
2 · 𝑠), and 
𝐼𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝑡) is the RMS current at time 𝑡. 












where 𝑓𝑠 is the number of samples per second, and  
𝐼𝑟𝑚𝑠(𝑖) is the rms current at instant 𝑖. 






where 𝐸𝑃𝐿(𝑘) is the active energy consumed during period 𝑘 in (𝑘𝑊ℎ),  
𝐴𝑅𝐼2(𝑘) is the area under the squared current during period 𝑘 in (𝐴
2 · 𝑠) 
𝑅 is the cable resistance in (Ω), and 
𝛼 is constant (𝛼 = 1000 × 60 × 60). 
Now, we can use (76) to calculate the energy losses in each cable even if 𝐴𝑅𝐼2 is being 
send by the smart meter at low frequency (e.g. hourly).  Equation (76) is used in the 
previous example with two cables to calculate the energy losses using only one 
measurement in the specified hour for both loads.  The same can be applied to reactive 






where 𝐸𝑞𝐿(𝑘) is the reactive energy consumed during period 𝑘 in (𝑘𝑉𝑎𝑟ℎ), and 
𝑋 is the series reactance of the cable in (Ω). 
Next, the solutions proposed to overcome the issue of time skew and low rate 
measurements will be applied to the tampering detection system.  The new measurer can 
be applied to detection algorithm; first for estimating the cable resistance and reactance as 
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explained in subsection 3.3.3, and then to the detection algorithm as explained in 
subsection 3.3.4. 
3.3.3 Application to Cable Impedance Estimator 
In this section, the instantaneous real-time measurements will be replaced by low rate 
measurements to estimate the cable impedance, therefore, (32) and (35) will become: 
































𝐸𝑝𝑖(𝑘) is the active energy consumption measured at meter 𝑖 during period 𝑘 in 𝑘𝑊ℎ, 
𝐸𝑞𝑖(𝑘) is the reactive energy consumption measured at meter 𝑖 during period 𝑘 in 𝑘𝑉𝑎𝑟ℎ,  
𝐴𝑅𝐼𝑖
2(𝑘) is the area under the squared RMS current measured by meter 𝑖 during period 𝑘, 
𝑅𝑖 is the series resistance of cable 𝑖, and 
𝑋𝑖 is is the series reactance of cable 𝑖. 
The value of resistance and series reactance can be estimated by using (78) and (79) at four 
different periods (i.e. 𝑘, 𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 + 2, and 𝑘 + 3).  The same can be generalized for case 
of 𝑀 check meters where 2𝑀 −𝑀 − 1 different periods needed to solve for 𝑅1, 𝑅2, … 
𝑅2𝑀−𝑀−1 and 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋2𝑀−𝑀−1.  The cable impedance can be calculated once when no 
83 
 
meter is in error on a regular basis (to account for potential system reconfiguration and 
cable aging), then it can be used in detection algorithm as explained in subsection 3.3.4. 
3.3.4 Application to Modified Detection Algorithm 
To include the active energy losses in the syndrome vector calculation, () and () will be 
modified and calculated as: 






































?̃?𝑬𝒑(𝑘) is the active energy syndrome vector for the period 𝑘, 
?̂?𝒑(𝑘) is vector of active energy measurements of all meters for the period 𝑘, 
𝐴?̃?𝐼𝑖
2(𝑘) the area under the squared current measured by meter 𝑖 for the period 𝑘,  
?̂?𝑷𝑳(𝑘) is vector of active energy losses calculated for the period 𝑘, and  
𝐷 is the decoding matrix shown in (18). 
The same can be applied to reactive power losses as: 








































?̃?𝑬𝒒(𝑘) is the reactive energy syndrome vector for the period 𝑘, 
?̂?𝒒(𝑘) is vector of reactive energy measurements of all meters for the period 𝑘, and 
?̂?𝑸𝑳(𝑘) is vector of active energy losses calculated for the period 𝑘. 
For errors in smart meters, there are three possible scenarios which are: no meter in error, 
check meter in error, and regular meter in error.  In addition to that, the estimation of other 
sources of non-technical losses will be addressed as well.  Next, the modified algorithm for 
each type is explained. 
A. No Meter in Error 
When there is no meter in error at duration 𝑘, the following equations will be satisfied: 
 ?̂?𝒑(𝑘) = 𝑬𝒑(𝑘) (84) 
 ?̂?𝒒(𝑘) = 𝑬𝒒(𝑘) (85) 
 ?̂?𝑷𝑳(𝑘) = 𝑬𝑷𝑳(𝑘) (86) 




𝑬𝒑(𝑘) is the vector actual (correct) active energies supposed to be measured by the smart 
meters for duration 𝑘, 
𝑬𝒒(𝑘) is the vector actual (correct) reactive energies supposed to be measured by the smart 
meters for duration 𝑘, 
𝑬𝑷𝑳(𝑘) is the vector actual (correct) active energy losses supposed to be calculated for 
duration 𝑘, and 
𝑬𝑸𝑳(𝑘) is the vector actual (correct) reactive energy losses supposed to be calculated for 
duration 𝑘. 
Therefore, the active and reactive energies’ syndrome vectors will return zeros as: 

















































































































































= [0   0   0] 
(88) 
where, 
𝐴𝑅𝐼12(𝑘) is the actual (correct) area under the squared current supposed to be measured by 
meter 𝑖 for the period 𝑘, and 
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𝐸𝑝𝑖(𝑘) is the actual (correct) active energy supposed to be measured by meter 𝑖 for duration 
𝑘. 
The same can be applied to reactive power as: 

















































































































































= [0   0   0] 
(89) 
𝐸𝑝𝑖(𝑘) is the actual (correct) reactive energy supposed to be measured by meter 𝑖 for 
duration 𝑘. 
B. Check Meter in Error 
When check meter is in error during period 𝑘, the syndrome vector will result in a vector 
that has a form similar to one of the rows of decoding matrix multiplied by a scaler equal 
to the magnitude of error.  The active and reactive energy losses calculations will be correct 
since it will depend only on the measurements received form regular meters; therefore, (86) 
and (87) will be applicable but (84) and (85) will not be applicable, therefore:  
 ?̂?𝒑(𝑘) ≠ 𝑬𝒑(𝑘) (90) 
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 ?̂?𝒒(𝑘) ≠ 𝑬𝒒(𝑘) (91) 
To see the calculations for an error in check meters, we are going to assume an error in the 
measurement of check meter number 6 during period 𝑘, then the syndrome vector will 
result in: 

















































































































































= [0   − 𝑒𝐸𝑝6(𝑘)   0] 
(92) 
where 𝑒𝐸𝑝𝑖(𝑘) is the error in active energy measurement of meter 𝑖 for period 𝑘. 
We can see that the form of the syndrome vector is similar to row number 6 of decoding 
matrix 𝐷 multiplied by a scaler equal to the magnitude of error.  Now, the measurement 
vector, i.e. 𝑬𝒑(𝑘), can be corrected by adding the error vector as: 
 ?̂?𝒑𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅(𝑘) = ?̂?𝒑(𝑘) − 𝒆𝑬𝒑(𝑘) = 𝑬𝒑(𝑘) (93) 
where, 
 𝒆𝑬𝒑(𝑘) = [0    0    0    0    0   𝑒𝐸𝑝6(𝑘)    0] (94) 
𝑒𝐸𝑝6(𝑘) is the error in active energy measurement of check meter number 6 for period 𝑘, 
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?̂?𝒑𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅(𝑘) is the vector of corrected active energy consumption supposed to be 
measured by all meters for period 𝑘, and 
𝒆𝑬𝒑(𝑘) is error vector of active energy for period 𝑘. 
The same can be applied to reactive power as: 

















































































































































= [0   − 𝑒𝐸𝑞6(𝑘)   0] 
(95) 
We can see that the form of the syndrome vector is similar to row number 6 of decoding 
matrix 𝐷 multiplied by a scaler equal to the magnitude of error.  Now, the measurement 
vector, i.e. 𝑬𝒒(𝑘), can be corrected by adding the error vector as: 
 ?̂?𝒒𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅(𝑘) = ?̂?𝒒(𝑘) − 𝒆𝑬𝒒(𝑘) = 𝑬𝒒(𝑘) (96) 
where, 
 𝒆𝑬𝒒(𝑘) = [0    0    0    0    0    𝑒𝐸𝑞6(𝑘)    0] (97) 
𝑒𝐸𝑞6(𝑘) is the error in reactive energy measurement of check meter number 6 for period 𝑘, 
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?̂?𝒒𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅(𝑘) is the vector of corrected reactive energy consumption supposed to be 
measured by all meters for period 𝑘, and 
𝒆𝑬𝒑(𝑘) is error vector of active energy for period 𝑘. 
C. Regular Meter in Error 
Unlike the case of a check meter in error, when regular meter is in error during period 𝑘, 
the active and reactive energy losses calculations related to the meter in error will be wrong, 
i.e. all of (84), (85), (86), and (87) are not applicable.  Therefore, in addition to (90) and 
(91), the following also is true: 
 ?̂?𝑷𝑳(𝑘) ≠ 𝑬𝑷𝑳(𝑘) (98) 
 ?̂?𝑸𝑳(𝑘) ≠ 𝑬𝑸𝑳(𝑘) (99) 
The syndrome vector will result in a vector that has a form similar to one of the rows of 
decoding matrix multiplied by a scaler equal to the magnitude of error plus the energy 
losses related to the meter in error.  To demonstrate that, we will assume an error in 
measurement of regular meter number 3; hence, the active power’s syndrome vector will 
result in: 





































































































































































𝑒𝐸𝑝3(𝑘) is the error in reactive energy measurement of check meter number 3 for period 𝑘, 
𝑒𝐴𝐼3(𝑘) is the error in the area under the squared current of meter number 3 for period 𝑘. 
The same can be applied to reactive energy as: 





































































































































































We can see that the syndrome vectors include the error in active and reactive energy 
measurements, i.e. 𝑒𝐸𝑝3(𝑘) and 𝑒𝐸𝑞3(𝑘), but it also includes additional terms that will affect 






 .  Therefore, the syndrome vector cannot 
be used directly to correct the measurement of regular meter.  This can be solved by adding 
the wrong active and reactive energy measured to the wrong active and reactive energy 
losses calculated and subtract the mismatch detected form the syndrome vector which will 
add up and will equal to the actual (corrected) active and reactive energies at sending end 
as: 
 
𝐸𝑝𝑠𝑑3(𝑘) = (𝐸𝑝3(𝑘) + 𝑒𝐸𝑝3(𝑘)) +












𝐸𝑞𝑠𝑑3(𝑘) = (𝐸𝑞3(𝑘) + 𝑒𝐸𝑞3(𝑘)) +










where 𝐸𝑝𝑠𝑑3(𝑘) is the actual (corrected) active energy at sending end of cable number 3, 
𝐸𝑞𝑠𝑑3(𝑘) is the actual (corrected) reactive energy at sending end of cable number 3. 
Since the corrected values are the active and reactive energies at sending end, (61), (62), 
and (63) cannot be applied.  Therefore, this algorithm can estimate the actual energy at 
sending end which equals to the actual energy consumed in addition to the actual energy 
losses in that cable, hence: 
 
?̂?𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑3













D. Other Sources of NTL 
After inspection, if the service provider found that the mismatch in syndrome vector was 
due to other source of NTL such as cable tapping, then the regular meter is not in error and 
all of (84), (85), (86), and (87) is applicable but the syndrome vector will not return zeros 
as shown: 

















































































































































≠ [0   0   0] 
(106) 
Here all the smart meters readings are correct, but the syndrome vector will return non-
zero numbers due to another source of NTL.  The check meter readings 𝐸𝑝5(𝑘), 𝐸𝑝6(𝑘)and 
𝐸𝑝7(𝑘) will include an additional term 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑝(𝑘) that represents the energy consumed due 
to the new source of NTL during period 𝑘.  For example, if 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑝3(𝑘) is the active energy 
losses due to tapping of cable number 3 during period 𝑘, then (106) will result in: 
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 ?̃?𝑬𝒑(𝑘) = ?̂?𝒑(𝑘) · 𝐷 + ?̂?𝑷𝑳(𝑘) · 𝐷 = 𝑬𝒑(𝑘) · 𝐷 + 𝑬𝑷𝑳(𝑘) · 𝐷
= [0    − 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑝3(𝑘)      − 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑝3(𝑘)] 
(107) 
Similarly, the reactive power syndrome vector can be written as: 
 ?̃?𝑬𝒒(𝑘) = ?̂?𝒒(𝑘) · 𝐷 + ?̂?𝑸𝑳(𝑘) · 𝐷 = 𝑬𝒒(𝑘) · 𝐷 + 𝑬𝑸𝑳(𝑘) · 𝐷
= [0    − 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑞3(𝑘)      − 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑞3(𝑘) ] 
(108) 
where 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑞3(𝑘)  is the reactive energy losses due to tapping of cable number 3 during 
period 𝑘. 
Here 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑝3(𝑘)  and 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑞3(𝑘)   will appear in all check meters taking measurement of 
cable corresponding to the cable being tapped.  Also, 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑝3(𝑘)  and 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑞3(𝑘) include 
the direct and indirect NTL related to the attack during period 𝑘, e.g., if the source of NTL 
was tapping the service cable, the values 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑝3(𝑘) and 𝑒𝑁𝑇𝐿𝐸𝑞3(𝑘) represents the sum of 
energy consumed and the energy losses added to the service cable because of the tapping.  
Here we can consider the energy losses in the cable as non-technical losses NTL instead of 
being technical losses TL; because this amount of losses would not exist if the source of 






4 CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
4.1 Simulation Results and Discussion 
In this section, the method proposed is simulated on a system having four regular meters 
and three check meters as shown in Figure 3.21.  The cables simulated are the commercially 
available 1/0 AWG cables, each having a different length (i.e. 80, 100, 150, and 200 
meters). The properties of cables are shown in Table 7.  The shunt capacitance can be 
ignored for low voltage distribution secondary cables because of their relatively small 
length and low operating voltage [41].  The cables used here are relatively smaller than the 
cables used in distribution secondary since each cable here is feeding a single house as 
shown in Figure 3.21.   




Insulation Type 𝑋𝐿𝑃𝐸 
Ampacity in Duct (𝑨) 140 
Operating Voltage (𝑽) 230 
Operating Temperature (°𝑪) 50 
AC Resistance (𝐦Ω/𝒎), at 60 Hz 0.3821 
Series Reactance (𝐦Ω/𝒎), at 60 Hz 0.1605 
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The simulation is divided into two subsections to simulate two different system 
capabilities, i.e. system report metering data at high frequency, and a system that report 
metering data at low frequency.  The high frequency measurement-based detection 
algorithm utilizes real time active power, reactive power, RMS voltage, and RMS current 
in detection and correction.  On the other hand, the low frequency measurement-based 
detection algorithm is utilizing the active energy, reactive energy, and the area under the 
squared RMS current.  Subsection 4.1.1 is discussing the simulation of a system that reports 
metering data at high frequency and Subsection 4.1.2 is discussing the simulation of a 
system that report metering data at low frequency. 
4.1.1 Detection Algorithm for Systems Reporting Measurement Data at High 
Frequency 
The simulation is based on actual house active power load profile that record the data at a 
rate of 1 measurement per minute representing the average power consumed during that 
minute.  On the other hand, the reactive power, RMS current, and RMS voltage information 
were randomly generated to change at the same rate of active power, i.e. once each minute.  
Each minute data is then divided into 60 identical samples (i.e. one measurement each 
second) to simulate a system reporting the data at a frequency of 1 measurement per second.  
The case studies are performed on errors during one hour of the day, i.e. form 11:00 AM 
to 12:00 PM.  The plots of all meters are shown in Appendix A, the plots are representing 
the actual load profiles when no meter is in error.  
The cable resistances are estimated using (32) at four different time instants to generate 
four different independent equations.  The generated equations are: 
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 0.247691917𝑅1 + 0.472187313𝑅2 + 0.260104410𝑅3
+ 0.705302415𝑅4 = 0.094420819 
0.249784297𝑅1 + 0.463453535𝑅2 + 0.256968950𝑅3
+ 0.485609853𝑅4 = 0.077182446 
0.259048629𝑅1 + 0.628052851𝑅2 + 1.056315575𝑅3
+ 0.517071482𝑅4 = 0.131973828 
0.280608489𝑅1 + 0.575278840𝑅2 + 1.308054186𝑅3
+ 0.572785766𝑅4 = 0.149302459 
(109) 
These equations are solved to determine the cable resistances, the estimated resistances and 
their comparison to the actual values is summarized in Table 8.  Similarly, the cable series 
reactances are estimated using (35) the same time instants used to estimate the cable 
resistances to generate four different independent equations.  The generated equations are: 
 0.247691917𝑋1 + 0.472187313𝑋2 + 0.260104410𝑋3
+ 0.705302415𝑋4 = 0.039661192 
0.249784297𝑋1 + 0.463453535𝑋2 + 0.256968950𝑋3
+ 0.485609853𝑋4 = 0.032420263 
0.259048629𝑋1 + 0.628052851𝑋2 + 1.056315575𝑋3
+ 0.517071482𝑋4 = 0.055435225 
0.280608489𝑋1 + 0.575278840𝑋2 + 1.308054186𝑋3
+ 0.572785766𝑋4 = 0.062714066 
(110) 
These equations are solved to determine the cable series reactances, the estimated 




Table 8: Estimated Values of Cable Impedance 
Attribute Actual Estimated % Difference 
𝑹𝟏(Ω) 0.030568 0.030568 0.00 
𝑹𝟐(Ω) 0.038210 0.038210 0.00 
𝑹𝟑(Ω) 0.057315 0.057315 0.00 
𝑹𝟒(Ω) 0.076420 0.076420 0.00 
𝑿𝟏(Ω) 0.012840 0.012840 0.00 
𝑿𝟐(Ω) 0.016050 0.016050 0.00 
𝑿𝟑(Ω) 0.024075 0.024075 0.00 
𝑿𝟒(Ω) 0.032100 0.032100 0.00 
The estimated values of resistances and reactances will be used in detection algorithms of 
all cause studies, i.e. check meter in error, regular meter in error, and other source of NTL.  
A. Check Meter in Error 
Random errors are created in both active and reactive power measurements of check meter 
number 7, as shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 respectively.  The active power 
measurement is corrected based on (49) which is taking the vector of active power 
measurements and the error vector (50) as input.  The error vector, i.e. (50), can be 
determined from the syndrome vector (48).  The input to the syndrome vector calculator 
are the cable resistances, active power measurements of all meters (regular and check), and 
the RMS current measurements of regular meters.  The syndrome vector returns the 
difference between the actual value and measured value at each time instant.  The corrected 
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active power profile is labeled in Figure 4.1 as Corrected.  The corrected active power 
profile is the same as the actual active power profile with no error in estimation (i.e. 0%).  
 
Figure 4.1: Active power of check meter no. 7 for one hour 
Similarly, the reactive power measurement is corrected based on (52) which is taking the 
vector of reactive power measurements and the error vector (53) as input.  The error vector, 
i.e. (52), can be determined from the syndrome vector (51).  The input to the syndrome 
vector calculator is the cable reactances, reactive power measurements of all meters 
(regular and check), and the RMS current measurements of regular meters.  The syndrome 
vector returns the difference between the actual value and measured value at each time 
instant.  The corrected reactive power profile is labeled in Figure 4.2 as Corrected.  The 
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corrected reactive power profile is the same as the actual reactive power profile with no 
error in estimation (i.e. 0%). 
 
Figure 4.2: Reactive power of check meter no. 7 for one hour 
The modified detection algorithm proposed in this work is compared to the original 
detection algorithm of [9].  The comparison is performed on two cases, first without power 
losses compensation by using (20), and second with power losses compensation by using 
(24). 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] without power losses compensation in 
the calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (20), is shown in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 
respectively.  Figure 4.3 shows the deviation of corrected active power from actual value 
and Figure 4.4 shows the deviation of corrected reactive power from actual value.  Notice 




Figure 4.3: Comparison between the active power estimation of the previous algorithm with no power losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of check meter no. 7 in error 
 
Figure 4.4: Comparison between the reactive power estimation of the previous algorithm with no power losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of check meter no. 7 in error 
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The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] with power losses compensation in the 
calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (24), is shown in  Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 
respectively.  Using (24), there is no constant value 𝛿𝑖 that can be used as the correct ratio 
of power losses all the time, and consequently it is not possible to use 𝛿𝑖 as estimated ratio 
of power losses.  Therefore, we used the average ratio of power losses of 24 hours to 
represent the constant ratio of power losses in the detection algorithm.  The average ratios 
of active and reactive power losses for the 24 hours are calculated and shown in Table 9.  
Table 9: Ratios of Power Losses as Percentage to Delivered Power 
Cable Number Ratio of Active Power 
Losses 
Ratio of Reactive Power 
Losses 
Cable 1 0.28859% 0.98038 % 
Cable 2 0.40082% 0.69828 % 
Cable 3 0.60646% 2.23361 % 




Figure 4.5: Comparison between the active power estimation of the previous algorithm with power losses compensation 
and the modified algorithm for the case of check meter no. 7 in error 
 
Figure 4.6: Comparison between the reactive power estimation of the previous algorithm with power losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of check meter no. 7 in error 
103 
 
As we can see from Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 , the modified detection algorithm 
outperformed the original detection algorithm that was proposed in [9] even with the use 
of power losses compensation. Notice that the y-axis on the right in Figure 4.5 and Figure 
4.6 are values multiplied by 10−5.  
B. Regular Meter in Error 
Random errors are created in all of: active power, reactive power, and RMS current 
measurements of regular meter number 4, as shown in Figure 4.7, Figure 4.8, and Figure 
4.9 respectively.  The active power measurement is corrected based on (62) which is taking 
the actual active power at sending end (59) and the the corrected RMS current at the 
sending end (61) as inputs.  The actual active power at sending end, i.e. (59), is determined 
by addition of the wrong active power measured to the wrong active power losses 
calculated in (56), then subtract the mismatch detected form the syndrome vector (56) 
which will add up and will equal to the actual active and reactive power at sending end.  
The corrected active power profile is labeled in Figure 4.7 as Corrected.  The corrected 
active power profile is the same as the actual active power profile with no error in 




Figure 4.7: Active power of regular meter no. 4 for one hour 
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Similarly, the reactive power measurement is corrected and the corrected reactive power 
profile is labeled in Figure 4.8 as Corrected.  The corrected reactive power profile is the 
same as the actual reactive power profile with no error in estimation (i.e. 0%). 
 
Figure 4.8: Reactive power of regular meter no. 4 for one hour 
The RMS current is corrected based on (61), the input to (61) is the RMS voltage of check 
meter, active power at sending end (59), and reactive power at sending end (60).  The RMS 
current profile is labeled in Figure 4.9 as Corrected.  Which is the same as the actual active 




Figure 4.9: RMS current of regular meter no. 4 for one hour 
The modified detection algorithm proposed in this work is compared to the original 
detection algorithm of [9].  The comparison is performed on two cases, first without power 
losses compensation, i.e. by using (20), and second with power losses compensation, i.e. 
by using (24). 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] without power losses compensation in 
the calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (20), is shown in  Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 
respectively.  Figure 4.10 shows the deviation of corrected active power from actual value 
and Figure 4.11 shows the deviation of corrected reactive power from actual value.  Notice 




Figure 4.10: Comparison between the active power estimation of the previous algorithm with no power losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of regular meter no. 4 in error 
 
Figure 4.11: Comparison between the reactive power estimation of the previous algorithm with no power losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of regular meter no. 4 in error 
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The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] with power losses compensation in the 
calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (24), is shown in  Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13 
respectively.  The average ratios of active and reactive power losses for the 24 hours are 
calculated and shown in Table 9.  
 
Figure 4.12: Comparison between the active power estimation of the previous algorithm with power losses 




Figure 4.13: Comparison between the reactive power estimation of the previous algorithm with power losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of regular meter no. 4 in error 
As we can see from Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13, the modified detection algorithm 
outperformed the original detection algorithm that was proposed in [9] even with the use 
of power losses compensation. Notice that the y-axis on the right in Figure 4.12 and Figure 
4.13 are values multiplied by 10−5. 
C. Another Source of NTL 
Random active and reactive power consumption is created along cable number 4 to 
represent unauthorized tapping in the cable.  The estimated power consumption (labeled as 
Estimated NTL) is the result of applying (69) and (70) on the measurements received form 
all meters.  The estimated NTL is the summation of the power consumed and the power 
losses added to the distribution secondary due to cable tapping.  As can be seen in Figure 
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4.14 and Figure 4.15, the active and reactive corrected power consumption are the same as 
the actual consumption with no error in estimation (i.e. 0%). 
 




Figure 4.15: Reactive power tapped from cable no. 4 
The modified detection algorithm proposed in this work is compared to the original 
detection algorithm of [9].  The comparison is performed on two cases, first without power 
losses compensation, i.e. by using (20), and second with power losses compensation, i.e. 
by using (24). 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] without power losses compensation in 
the calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (20), is shown in  Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 
respectively.  Figure 4.16 shows the deviation of corrected active power from actual value 
and Figure 4.17 shows the deviation of corrected reactive power from actual value.  Notice 




Figure 4.16: Comparison between the active power estimation of the previous algorithm with no power losses 




Figure 4.17: Comparison between the reactive power estimation of the previous algorithm with no power losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of tapping cable no. 4 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] with power losses compensation in the 
calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (24), is shown in  Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19 
respectively.  The average ratios of active and reactive power losses for the 24 hours are 




Figure 4.18: Comparison between the active power estimation of the previous algorithm with power losses 




Figure 4.19: Comparison between the reactive power estimation of the previous algorithm with power losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of tapping cable no. 4 
As we can see from Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19, the modified detection algorithm 
outperformed the original detection algorithm that was proposed in [9] even with the use 
of power losses compensation. Notice that the y-axis on the right in Figure 4.18 and Figure 
4.19 are values multiplied by 10−5. 
4.1.2 Detection Algorithm for Systems Reporting Measurement Data at Low 
Frequency 
The measurements are assumed to be received once each hour; i.e., the default resolution 
of PG&E smart metering system [42].  The load profiles used are based on real house load 
profile data (same profile used in subsection 4.1.1) having a resolution of one measurement 
each minute, the measurements resolution reduced to one measurement each hour to show 
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the robustness of the proposed method in estimating the energy losses at low-rate 
measurements.  The reactive power, RMS current, and RMS voltage information was 
randomly generated.  The simulations are based on the active energy, reactive energy, and 
the area under the squared current measurements received on hourly basis.  The case studies 
are performed on errors for one day, i.e. 24 hours.  The plots of all meters are shown in 
Appendix B, the plots are representing the actual load profiles when no meter is in error. 
Firstly, the cable resistances are estimated using (78) at four different time instants to 
generate four different independent equations.  The generated equations are: 
 0.372628787𝑅1 + 1.175087757𝑅2 + 0.808581126𝑅3
+ 0.969002857𝑅4 = 0.176685646 
0.385930272𝑅1 + 0.635761654𝑅2 + 0.777956112𝑅3
+ 1.298538639𝑅4 = 0.179912447 
0.744203206𝑅1 + 0.593347770𝑅2 + 2.167513946𝑅3
+ 1.101911749𝑅4 = 0.253859780 
1.642114276𝑅1 + 0.797488309𝑅2 + 0.681384437𝑅3
+ 0.769336342𝑅4 = 0.178514410 
(111) 
These equations are solved to determine the cable resistances, the estimated resistances and 
their comparison to the actual values is summarized in Table 10.  Similarly, the cable series 
reactances are estimated using (79) the same time instants used to estimate the cable 
resistances to generate four different independent equations.  The generated equations are: 
 0.372628787𝑋1 + 1.175087757𝑋2 + 0.808581126𝑋3
+ 0.969002857𝑋4 = 0.074216294 
0.385930272𝑋1 + 0.635761654𝑋2 + 0.777956112𝑋3




0.744203206𝑋1 + 0.59334777𝑋2 + 2.167513946𝑋3
+ 1.101911749𝑋4 = 0.106633066 
1.642114276𝑋1 + 0.797488309𝑋2 + 0.681384437𝑋3
+ 0.769336342𝑋4 = 0.074984462 
These equations are solved to determine the cable series reactances, the estimated 
reactances and their comparison to the actual values is summarized in Table 10. 
Table 10: Estimated Values of Cable Impedance Using Area Under the Squared Current 
Attribute Actual Estimated % Difference 
𝑹𝟏(Ω) 0.030568 0.030568 0.00 
𝑹𝟐(Ω) 0.038210 0.038210 0.00 
𝑹𝟑(Ω) 0.057315 0.057315 0.00 
𝑹𝟒(Ω) 0.076420 0.076420 0.00 
𝑿𝟏(Ω) 0.012840 0.012840 0.00 
𝑿𝟐(Ω) 0.016050 0.016050 0.00 
𝑿𝟑(Ω) 0.024075 0.024075 0.00 
𝑿𝟒(Ω) 0.032100 0.032100 0.00 
Now, the estimated values of resistances and reactances will be used in detection 
algorithms of all cause studies, i.e. check meter in error, regular meter in error, and other 
source of NTL.  
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D. Check Meter in Error 
Random errors are created in both active and reactive energy measurements of check meter 
number 5, as shown in Figure 3.22 and Figure 3.23 respectively.  The active energy 
measurement is corrected based on (93) which is taking the vector of active energy 
measurements and the error vector (94) as input.  The error vector, i.e. (94), can be 
determined from the syndrome vector (92).  The input to the syndrome vector calculator is 
the cable resistances, active energy measurements of all meters (regular and check), and 
the area under the squared RMS current measurements of regular meters.  The syndrome 
vector returns the difference between the actual value and measured value for each period.  
The corrected active power profile is labeled in Figure 3.22 as Corrected.  The corrected 
active energy profile is the same as the actual active energy profile with no error in 




Figure 4.20: Active energy of check meter no. 5 for 24 hours 
Similarly, the reactive energy measurement is corrected based on (96) which is taking the 
vector of reactive energy measurements (91) and the error vector (97) as inputs.  The error 
vector, i.e. (97), can be determined from the syndrome vector (95).  The input to the 
syndrome vector calculator is the cable reactances, reactive energy measurements of all 
meters (regular and check), and the area under the squared RMS current measurements of 
regular meters.  The syndrome vector returns the difference between the actual value and 
measured value for each period.  The corrected reactive energy profile is labeled in Figure 
3.23 as Corrected.  The corrected reactive energy profile is the same as the actual reactive 




Figure 4.21: Reactive energy of check meter no. 5 for 24 hours 
The modified detection algorithm proposed in this work is compared to the original 
detection algorithm of [9].  The comparison is performed on two cases, first without energy 
losses compensation, i.e. by using (20), and second with energy losses compensation, i.e. 
by using (24). 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] without energy losses compensation in 
the calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (20), is shown in Figure 4.22 and Figure 4.23 
respectively.  Figure 4.22 shows the deviation of corrected active energy from actual value 
and Figure 4.23 shows the deviation of corrected reactive energy from actual value.  Notice 




Figure 4.22: Comparison between the active energy estimation of the previous algorithm with no energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of check meter no. 5 in error 
 
Figure 4.23: Comparison between the reactive energy estimation of the previous algorithm with no energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of check meter no. 5 in error 
122 
 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] with energy losses compensation in the 
calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (24), is shown in  Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.25 
respectively.  Using (24), there is no constant value 𝛿𝑖 that can be used as the correct ratio 
of energy losses all the time, and consequently it is not possible to use 𝛿𝑖 as estimated ratio 
of energy losses.  Therefore, we used the average ratio of energy losses of 24 hours to 
represent the constant ratio of energy losses in the detection algorithm.  The average ratios 
of active and reactive energy losses for the 24 hours are calculated and shown in Table 11.  
Table 11: Ratios of Energy Losses as Percentage to Delivered Energy 
Cable Number Ratio of Active Energy 
Losses 
Ratio of Reactive Energy 
Losses 
Cable 1 0.28859% 0.98038 % 
Cable 2 0.40082% 0.69828 % 
Cable 3 0.60646% 2.23361 % 




Figure 4.24: Comparison between the active energy estimation of the previous algorithm with energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of check meter no. 5 in error 
 
Figure 4.25: Comparison between the reactive energy estimation of the previous algorithm with energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of check meter no. 5 in error 
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As we can see from Figure 4.24 and Figure 4.25, the modified detection algorithm 
outperformed the original detection algorithm that was proposed in [9] even with the use 
of energy losses compensation. Notice that the y-axis on the right in Figure 4.24 and Figure 
4.25 are values multiplied by 10−6.  
E. Regular Meter in Error 
Random errors are created in all of: active energy, reactive energy, and the area under the 
squared RMS current measurements of regular meter number 2, as shown in Figure 4.26 
and Figure 4.27 respectively.  The active energy measurement is corrected based on (104) 
which is taking the actual active energy at sending end (102) as input.  The actual active 
energy at sending end, i.e. (102), is determined by addition of the wrong active energy 
measured to the wrong active energy losses calculated inside syndrome vector (101), then 
subtract the mismatch detected form the syndrome vector (101) which will add up and will 
equal to the actual active energy at sending end.  The corrected active energy profile is 
labeled in Figure 4.26 as Corrected.  The corrected active energy profile is the same as the 




Figure 4.26: Active energy of regular meter no. 2 for 24 hours 
Similarly, the reactive energy measurement is corrected and the corrected reactive energy 
profile is labeled in Figure 4.27 as Corrected.  The corrected reactive energy profile is the 





Figure 4.27: Reactive energy of regular meter no. 2 for 24 hours 
The modified detection algorithm proposed in this work is compared to the original 
detection algorithm of [9].  The comparison is performed on two cases, first without power 
losses compensation, i.e. by using (20), and second with power losses compensation, i.e. 
by using (24). 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] without power losses compensation in 
the calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (20), is shown in  Figure 4.28 and Figure 4.29 
respectively.  Figure 4.28 shows the deviation of corrected active energy from actual value 
and Figure 4.29 shows the deviation of corrected reactive energy from actual value.  Notice 
that the y-axis on the right are values multiplied by 10−6.   
We can see that both the modified and the original algorithms deviates from actual values 
and the deviation of modified algorithm is less than the deviation of original algorithm.  In 
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addition to that, the deviation of modified algorithm is the magnitude of actual energy 
losses in cable number 2, where the deviation of original algorithm is due to error in 
estimation of energy losses of all cables related.  Therefore, when the number of cables 
increase (e.g. system having 10 check meters and 1013 regular meters) the error in the 
estimation of original algorithm will be much higher than the error in estimation of the 
modified algorithm.  
 
Figure 4.28: Comparison between the active energy estimation of the previous algorithm with no energy losses 




Figure 4.29: Comparison between the reactive energy estimation of the previous algorithm with no energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of regular meter no. 2 in error 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] with power losses compensation in the 
calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (24), is shown in  Figure 4.30 and Figure 4.31 
respectively.  The average ratios of active and reactive power losses for the 24 hours are 




Figure 4.30: Comparison between the active energy estimation of the previous algorithm with energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of regular meter no. 2 in error 
 
Figure 4.31: Comparison between the reactive energy estimation of the previous algorithm with energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of regular meter no. 2 in error 
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As we can see from Figure 4.30 and Figure 4.31, both the modified and the original 
algorithms deviates from actual values.  In addition to that, the deviation of modified 
algorithm is the magnitude of actual energy losses in cable number 2, where the deviation 
of original algorithm is due to error in estimation of energy losses of all cables related.  
Therefore, when the number of cables increase (e.g. system having 10 check meters and 
1013 regular meters) the error in the estimation of original algorithm will be much higher 
than the error in estimation of the modified algorithm. 
F. Another Source of NTL 
Random active and reactive energy consumption is created along cable number 2 to 
represent unauthorized tapping in the cable.  The estimated energy consumption (labeled 
as Estimated NTL) is the result of applying (107) and (108) on the measurements received 
form all meters.  The estimated NTL is the summation of the energy consumed and the 
energy losses added to the distribution secondary due to cable tapping.  As can be seen in 
Figure 4.32 and Figure 4.33, the active and reactive corrected energy consumption are the 




Figure 4.32: Active energy tapped from cable no. 2 
 
Figure 4.33: Reactive energy tapped from cable no. 2 
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The modified detection algorithm proposed in this work is compared to the original 
detection algorithm of [9].  The comparison is performed on two cases, first without energy 
losses compensation, i.e. by using (20), and second with energy losses compensation, i.e. 
by using (24). 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] without energy losses compensation in 
the calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (20), is shown in Figure 4.34 and Figure 4.35 
respectively.  Figure 4.34 shows the deviation of corrected active energy from actual value 
and Figure 4.35 shows the deviation of corrected reactive energy from actual value.  Notice 
that the y-axis on the right are values multiplied by 10−6 and 10−7. 
 
Figure 4.34: Comparison between the active energy estimation of the previous algorithm with no energy losses 




Figure 4.35: Comparison between the reactive energy estimation of the previous algorithm with no energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of tapping cable no. 2 
The comparison of the algorithm proposed in [9] with power losses compensation in the 
calculation of syndrome vector, i.e. using (24), is shown in  Figure 4.36 and Figure 4.37 
respectively.  The average ratios of active and reactive power losses for the 24 hours are 




Figure 4.36: Comparison between the active energy estimation of the previous algorithm with energy losses 




Figure 4.37: Comparison between the reactive energy estimation of the previous algorithm with energy losses 
compensation and the modified algorithm for the case of tapping cable no. 2 
As we can see from Figure 4.36 and Figure 4.37, the modified detection algorithm 
outperformed the original detection algorithm that was proposed in [9] even with the use 
of power losses compensation. Notice that the y-axis on the right in Figure 4.36 and Figure 
4.37 are values multiplied by 10−6. 
4.2 Conclusions and Recommendations 
In conclusion, both proposed algorithms, i.e. the first algorithm for a system reporting data 
at high rate and the second algorithm for a system reporting data at low rate, showed 
accurate estimation of technical and non-technical losses.  For the first algorithm, it 
included the calculation of power losses in service cables which lead to accurate values of 
syndrome vector and consequently accurate corrected consumption profiles that are 
identical to the actual consumption profiles with no error (0% error) for all error causes.  
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Moreover, the first algorithm was able to estimate cable impedances accurately using the 
already existing setup.  In addition to that, first algorithm formulated detection of other 
sources of NTL such as tapping the service cable (i.e., all meters are measuring correct 
values but there is other source of losses related to unregistered consumer).  The proposed 
algorithm for estimating the power consumed from other sources of NTL showed accurate 
estimation and it included the direct losses (i.e., actual power tapped) and the indirect losses 
(i.e., additional power losses in service cable due to power tapped). 
The second algorithm also showed accurate estimation of TL and NTL when the system 
reports the data at low rate, e.g. hourly.  Under the constraint of low data rate, the second 
algorithm showed ability to estimate cable impedance, energy losses, and detection and 
correction of non-technical losses.  For the causes of no error, check meter in error, and 
cable tapping, the second algorithm resulted in exact values that are supposed to be 
measured (i.e. 0% error).  In addition to that, the new unit of measurement proposed in this 
work made the second algorithm to be capable of accurate energy losses estimation when 
the meters report data at low rate.  Also, by using the new unit of measurement, the error 
due to time skew cause by deviation of real time clock is reduced by big magnitude.  
On the other hand, the second algorithm was not able to eliminate the power losses from 
the corrected values when the error is in a regular meter.  This resulted in deviation was 
not far from the deviation of original algorithm (i.e. [9]) for the cause of 3 check meters 
and 4 regular meters.  Notice that the second algorithm will outperform the original 
algorithm when used for a system having bigger number of meters; because the corrected 
value using the second algorithm will only include the energy losses related to the cable 
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feeding the meter in error, where the corrected values using the original algorithm will 
include the energy losses of all related cables. 
For future work, we recommend that the second algorithm to be further improved for more 
accurate correction of errors in the third case (i.e. an error in a regular meters).  In addition 
to that, we recommend that the proposed algorithms to be tested on hardware to verify the 
simulation results and evaluate other practical challenges.  Also, the smart meter designed 
in this work to be implemented and the new unit of measurement to be added to the 
measuring capabilities.  Finally, the new unit of measurement may be utilized in other 
applications in power system estimation and operation, such as proposing more accurate 
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The schematics of the smart meter 
 
R1 20k Ω 
R2 20k Ω 
R3 20k Ω 
R4 20k Ω 
R6 1k Ω 
R7 100 Ω 
R8 
36 Ω for 80A CT 
120 Ω for 30A CT 
C1 10µ F 
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